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ABSTRACT 
The ability of auditors to detect fraud, including intentional material misstatements in earnings, 
remains key to the credibility of audit firms and confidence in capital markets. The PCAOB 
concludes from its most recent inspections of public company audits that auditors often fail to 
assess and respond to risks of material misreporting by management. In a behavioral experiment, 
this study concludes that auditors can increase sensitivity to management motivation to misreport 
by actively seeking to transform identified risk factors focused on the organization, into factors 
focused on top managers, and to evaluate whether these manager-focused risk factors represent 
incentives for personal gain or pressures to avoid a personal loss on the managers. Currently, 
auditing standards use incentive and pressure as interchangeable constructs, but auditors in this 
study assess pressure on managers to avoid a loss as a greater risk than an incentive to managers 
to attain a gain. Results also demonstrate that auditors will be made more sensitive to fraudulent 
financial reporting risk when focusing on pressure on top managers, than they will be by 
engaging in a traditional process of assessing total fraud risk based on the three fraud triangle 
elements. This study is the first to propose a theoretical explanation for why prior studies reflect 
auditor insensitivity to organizational level fraud risk factors. This study is also the first to 
enhance knowledge about auditor risk assessment and decision-making through the application 
of prospect theory and through disaggregation of one of the three elements of the fraud triangle 
model, by differentiating between incentive and pressure for misreporting earnings.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The ability of auditors to detect intentional material misstatements in earnings remains 
key to the credibility of audit firms and confidence in capital markets. Auditing standards require 
financial statement auditors to consider risk factors for fraudulent financial reporting, and 
standards have been periodically updated to meet perceived deficiencies in auditor fraud risk 
assessment process.
1
  Most recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) issued its auditing standard AS No. 18 (PCAOB 2014) which requires public company 
auditors to obtain an understanding of senior management compensation arrangements that could 
lead to “incentives or pressures” to meet financial targets. AS No. 18 (PCAOB 2014) considers 
incentives and pressures on management within both fraudulent financial reporting and earnings 
management contexts. A company’s executive management is in a unique position to commit 
financial reporting fraud (PCAOB 2014) by overriding controls and acting in collusion with 
other employees (Center for Audit Quality 2010). The Securities and Exchange Commission 
identified the CEO or CFO as having some level of involvement in 89 percent of fraud cases 
between 1998 through 2007, up from 83 percent between 1987 through 1997 (COSO 2010). 
Some fraud risk factor examples in fraud auditing standards (SAS No. 99, AICPA 2002) focus 
directly on incentives and pressures on top managers, while others focus on organizational 
                                                          
1
 An extensive list of example fraud risk factors was first introduced into auditing standards with Statements on 
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82 (AICPA 1997). The organization of SAS No. 82 fraud risk factors was modified 
with the superseding standard, SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002). The SAS No.99 examples of fraud risk factors were 
subsequently recodified into AU 316 for public company audits, AU-C 240 for private company audits and ISA 240 
for in international auditing standards. Since SAS No. 99 is nearly identical to all of the recodifications of this fraud 
auditing standard, “SAS No. 99” will be used in this paper as an abbreviated reference to all of these auditing 
standards recodifications currently in use.  
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factors. However, reporting decisions are made by individual managers and groups of managers, 
not by the organization. Motivation to act can be held by managers, but not the by the 
organization itself. So a mental process is required before organizationally focused risk factors 
can be assessed for motivation impacts on top managers. Assimilating an understanding of 
executive compensation into organizationally-oriented fraud risk factor assessments requires 
additional cognitive effort by auditors. This research seeks to enhance auditor fraud risk 
assessment process for fraudulent financial reporting through extension of prior academic 
research and theory. 
Some fraud risk assessment activities by auditors in the field are low quality efforts 
(Brazel et al. 2010). One of the most significant recurring areas of audit deficiencies identified 
by the PCAOB from its 2013 and 2014 inspections of audits is that auditors fail to assess and 
respond to risks of material misstatement (PCAOB 2015). Post implementation of the Sarbanes 
Oxley anti-fraud legislation, the average number of public company restatements for fraud has 
declined from a high of 59 in 2002, but still remained an average of 40 or more annually from 
2003 to 2006 (Scholz 2014) 
2
. The number of public company material restatements, as 
summarized by Scholz (2014), has also declined from the post-Sarbanes Oxley financial 
reporting clean up period, but still remained at a level of hundreds annually through 2012. It is 
impossible to know how many of these misstatements are intentional, but from 2003 through 
2012, 75.9 percent of material restatements were corrections of overstated earnings, while only 
24.1percent were corrections of understated earnings. If these restatements were the result of 
unbiased random errors in reporting, one would expect the split between earnings decreasing 
                                                          
2
 Scholz (2014) reflects a decline in the number of fraud restatements during the years 2007 to 2012, but makes a 
statement that these years are likely incomplete due to the time lag necessary to identify fraudulent financial 
reporting through the source documents—the SECs Accounting and Audit Enforcement Releases (AAERs). 
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restatements and earnings increasing restatements to be in an approximately equal proportion. 
Intentionally misstated financial statements remain a significant concern for auditors, regulators 
and capital markets, and more research is needed to better understand causes of management 
fraud and ways to prevent and detect it (Center for Audit Quality 2010; COSO 2010). When it 
comes to detection of intentional misreporting, effective risk assessment and response by 
auditors is a high priority that needs to be addressed in audits (PCAOB 2015). 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) loss aversion can be used to predict that 
managers would feel a greater motivation to avoid a loss of wealth from some reference point 
than to realize and equal value gain in wealth from that same reference point. Many fraud risk 
factors in auditing standards communicate a direct or indirect motivation regarding such a gain 
or loss of top manager wealth. This study seeks to evaluate whether auditors perceive different 
levels of motivation for fraud, depending on whether fraud risk factors are framed as an incentive 
for gain or pressure to avoid a loss for top managers. This leads to the first research question:   
Fraud Risk Factor Framing 
Will auditors assess different levels of fraudulent financial reporting risk, and conduct different 
levels of risk-responsive audit procedures, when assessing motivation-for-fraud factors 
representing incentives to realize a gain versus pressure to avoid a loss? 
 
In this study, the use of the word “incentive” means “incentive to realize a gain” from some 
reference point, and use of the word “pressure” means “pressure to avoid a loss” from the same 
reference point. 
Most fraud risk factor examples for financial statement fraud motivation listed in auditing 
standards consist of risks focused on the organization.
3
 Yet, studies indicate that auditors often 
rate organizationally focused risk factors as being relatively less important to fraud risk 
                                                          
3
 Eleven of 15 fraud risk factor examples in AU 316 (13 of 17 fraud risk factor examples in AU–C 240) relate to the 
organization and its industry generally.  Only a few are fraud risk factors that relate to manager incentive/pressures. 
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assessment (Albrecht and Romney 1986; Apostolou et al. 2001; Wilks and Zimbelman 2004). A 
relatively unimportant organizationally focused risk factor from these studies could be 
considered relatively important to fraud risk assessment if it could be converted to a risk factor 
focused directly on top managers. This study seeks to compare differences between auditor risk 
assessment and auditor response to similar fraud risk factors focused on either the organization 
or on top managers in order to answer the following research question: 
Fraud Risk Factor Focus 
Will auditors assess different levels of fraudulent financial reporting risk, and conduct different 
levels of risk-responsive audit procedures, when assessing motivation-for-fraud factors focused 
on the organization versus on top managers, and will the fraud risk factor focus affect perceived 
differences between incentives and pressures? 
 
Any failure to incorporate an understanding of compensation structure into risk 
assessment could prevent auditors from recognizing differences between compensation related 
incentives or pressures on top managers. This failure to incorporate an understanding of 
compensation structure into risk assessment is important when risk factors observed are focused 
on the organization, and compensation payoffs to top managers are aligned with financial 
performance payoffs to the organization. In that setting, organizational financial performance 
should directly result in payoffs (wealth gains or wealth losses) to top managers who hold large 
portfolios of company stock and options. This discussion leads to the following research 
question: 
Executive Compensation Alignment with Organizational Payoffs 
Does the level of alignment between compensation payoffs to top management and financial 
performance payoffs to the organization and its shareholders/owners affect auditor assessments 
of incentive and pressures when fraud risk factors are focused on the organization? 
 
The objective of this study is to determine whether the level of risk assessments and audit 
work planned will vary based on whether audit risk factors are focused on the organization or on 
 5 
 
top managers, and whether audit risk factors are framed as incentives or pressures, including 
compensation-related incentives or pressures. If framing and focus impact the level of risk 
assessed, then how can this insight be used to inform the fraud risk assessment process to 
maximize sensitivity to fraud risks? And since some incentives and pressures relate to 
compensation, what is the role of understanding executive compensation in these risk 
assessments? Accordingly, the implication for this research is as follows: 
Research Implication Question 
Given answers to the research questions above, how can auditors conduct fraud risk assessment 
procedures in a way to maximize their sensitivity to fraudulent financial reporting risk? 
 
It is important to know whether auditors make systematically different risk assessments 
for different types of fraud risk factors so that fraud risk assessment can be conducted in a way to 
maximize sensitivity
4
 to fraud risks. The level of risk assessed by the auditor should influence 
audit planning decisions made. “The auditor should design and perform further audit procedures 
whose nature, timing, and extent are responsive to the assessed risks of material misstatement 
due to fraud at the assertion level” (AICPA 2006, AU 318.07). Sensitivity to fraud risks should 
lead auditors to plan relatively less evidential work when risk factors are assessed as low and 
relatively more evidential work when risk factors are assessed as high. 
The experiment in this study is specifically addressing motivation-for-fraud risk factors, 
which are labeled “incentives/pressures” in fraud auditing standards (SAS No. 99, AICPA 2002). 
The experiment sets SAS No. 99 attitude/rationalization fraud risk factors for financial statement 
fraud constant at low risk levels, sets SAS No. 99 opportunity fraud risk factors for financial 
statement fraud constant at high levels, and then manipulates two experimental factors for fraud 
motivation in a 2 X 2 factorial design: 1) motivation focus (organizational focus or individual top 
                                                          
4
 Sensitivity is the ability to distinguish between high and low level risk (Wilks and Zimbelman 2004; Faver-
Marchesi 2013; Zimbelman 1997).  
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manager focus) and 2) motivation frame (incentive for a gain or pressure to avoid a loss). In the 
experiment audit professionals assume the role of an audit manager reviewing audit work papers 
in a client audit case. Their initial work paper review consists of a risk assessment of fraud risk 
factors during audit planning prior to year-end. Participants consider fraud risk factors present in 
the case and assess risk levels for those factors. Four participant groups assess very similar 
factors for fraud motivation, which are framed in one of four ways in a between subjects 
experimental design. Also, two different management compensation structures are varied 
between groups receiving organizationally focused fraud risk factors. Additional case facts are 
then presented, including certain year-end account balances, and management explanation for 
those balances. This case information provides evidence of potential overstatement of revenues 
and accounts receivable by the client. Participants are then asked to consider case facts and their 
assessments of fraud risk, and to plan audit program steps to be responsive to case facts and their 
risk assessments.  
I find that auditors rate motivation-for-fraud risk as greatest when fraud risk factors are 
framed as pressure to avoid a loss focused on top managers. Auditors also make more risk 
responsive audit planning decisions for certain audit procedures when fraud risk factors are 
framed as a pressure to avoid a loss, rather than as incentive for a gain, or under managerially 
focused risk factors.  
These findings suggest that financial statement auditors can increase sensitivity to 
motivation-for-fraud risks by actively seeking to transform identified risk factors focused on the 
organization into risk factors that directly consider the impacts on top managers, and to evaluate 
whether these manager-focused risk factors represent incentives for personal gain, pressures to 
avoid a personal loss, or have no impact on top managers. Since managers make reporting 
 7 
 
decisions, not the organization itself, the motivation impact of organizationally focused risk 
factors are of greatest risk assessment value when they are transformed so that auditors can 
understand their motivation impacts on top managers.  
These findings contribute to both the academic literature and to practice. This study 
proposes a theoretical explanation and provides some evidence about why auditors in prior 
studies (Albrecht and Romney 1986; Apostolou 2001; Wilks and Zimbelman 2004) consider 
certain fraud risk factors focused on the organization or industry as relatively lower in relevance, 
and factors focused on management as relatively higher in relevance. Regarding risk assessment 
audit practice, Trompeter et al. (2013) observe that incentive and pressure are used 
interchangeably in auditing standards, but that the two could be different constructs and 
researchers should attempt to determine whether differences are important to fraud auditing. 
Regarding incentive and pressure outside of auditing contexts, the Center for Audit Quality 
(2010, p4) states: “Interestingly, academic research indicates that the desire to recoup or avoid 
losses is much more likely to motivate an individual to engage in activities that could lead to 
fraud than the desire for personal gain.”5 This current study responds to Trompeter et al. (2013) 
and to the Center for Audit Quality (2010) by providing evidence regarding these observations 
about incentive and pressure in a setting where auditors are considering management motivation 
to misreport. Results support that in auditing practice, attempting to identify risks representing 
pressure on top managers is a tangible way to increase sensitivity to fraud risks.  
                                                          
5
 The referenced source of this academic research is a Rick and Loewenstein (2008) commentary and critique in the 
Journal of Marketing Research on a paper about honesty by Mazar et al. (2008) in the same journal. Rick and 
Loewenstein (2008) invoke prospect theory and the fraud triangle model in their commentary. Auditing was not the 
subject of these two articles. 
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 The remainder of this dissertation is organized into six sections. The next section explains 
the evolution of fraud auditing standards and the incorporation of the fraud triangle model into 
auditing standards. Section 3 is a literature review of executive compensation and fraudulent 
financial reporting research. Section 4 develops hypotheses. Section 5 describes the research 
method. Section 6 describes results. The final section summarizes findings and discusses their 
implications. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW—FRAUD TRIANGLE AND RISK FACTORS IN AUDITING 
  
2.1 The Evolution of the Fraud Triangle and Fraud Auditing Standards 
 The primary fraud auditing standards in place today come from Statements on Auditing 
Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, commonly referred to 
as SAS 99 (AICPA 2002). The original SAS No. 99 standard is currently codified in AU 316 for 
U.S. public company audits, AU-C240 for U.S. private company audits and ISA 240 for 
companies audited under international auditing standards. These standards outline an auditor’s 
responsibilities for evaluating fraud risk when planning and executing a financial statement 
audit. Fraud risk factor examples in current auditing standards are organized and illustrated under 
the three categories of a fraud triangle model. A list of fraud risk factor examples in auditing 
standards is identical between AU 316, AU-C 240 and ISA 240. The three fraud triangle 
categorizations of fraud risk factors for fraudulent financial reporting from AU 316 are found in 
Appendix A of this dissertation. The three categories used in these standards are:  
1) Incentives/Pressures, 2) Opportunities, and 3) Attitudes/Rationalizations.        
             
Figure 1: Fraud Triangle Categories in Current Auditing Standards  
Incentive/Pressure
Opportunity Rationalization/Attititude
The Fraud Triangle
 10 
 
The fraud triangle is a decision aid designed to support an assessment of fraud risk, given 
the existence of observed indicators for fraud that fall under each of the three fraud triangle 
categories. Figure 2 below summarizes key developments in the birth of the fraud triangle 
concept and its evolution into a model influencing fraud risk assessment in current day auditing 
standards. The Fraud Triangle model is most commonly attributed to the work of criminologist 
Donald Cressey (1953), who conducted extensive multiple interviews of incarcerated individuals 
convicted of embezzlement crimes. Dr. Cressey modified his hypothesis throughout his period of 
interviews until it accurately described the situations of all of the embezzlers he interviewed 
(Cressey 1953). He concludes that the embezzlers each describe having: 1) a non-sharable 
financial problem, 2) an ability to secretly violate someone’s trust, and 3) verbalizations 
reconciling a breach of trust with their own positive self-view. Dr. Cressey also observes that 
these same embezzlers did not commit such crimes during earlier periods in their lives when one 
of the three hypothesized elements was not present. The hypothesis supported by Cressey (1953) 
results in a descriptive model of all cases he observed, which were from known fraud 
convictions. Fraud models that follow, including the model that is currently known as the fraud 
triangle, are used as predictive models.        
Dr. Cressey did not use the term “fraud triangle” in his work. Joseph Wells, who founded 
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (“ACFE”), met Dr. Cressey, and in 1985, asked 
him to appear in a fraud training video being produced by Wells, entitled “Embezzlement: The 
Thieves Within” (ACFE 1985).6 Dr. Cressey appears in the video, which for a time displays a 
triangle graphic. Dr. Cressey describes each of the three elements leading to embezzlement, and  
 
                                                          
6
 Information about this video is supported by a May 21, 2015 email response to me from a representative of the 
ACFE. 
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Figure 2: Evolution of the Fraud Triangle Model 
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the following three phrases appear at the bottom of the screen view: 1) Unsharable financial 
problem, 2) Access to funds, and 3) Rationalization. However, the first documented use of the 
term “fraud triangle” appeared later in an article about fraud in government entities (Albrecht 
1991) in which the fraud triangle elements are described as: 1) perceived pressures, 2) perceived 
opportunities, and 3) rationalization. The use of the word “perceived” in fraud triangle labels 
emphasize that perceptions of the same situations can vary between people, and that it is an 
individual’s perception of fraud elements that determine potentially fraudulent behavior. 
The perspective taken by fraud models shifted from the initial prerequisite perspective 
(all three elements of the fraud triangle must be present before fraud is perpetrated) to a 
probabilistic perspective, supported by results of a study of corporate fraud sponsored by an 
affiliate of a Big 8 firm, the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Foundation (the “Albrecht Study”). 
Initial models of fraud by Cressey (1953) and Cressey and Wells (ACFE 1985) originally stated 
that all three elements of fraud must be present in order for fraud to occur. The Albrecht Study 
(Albrecht et al. 1980; Albrecht et al. 1982) resulted in a probabilistic “fraud scale” model, where 
evidence of each of the three fraud elements was weighted to determine a likelihood of the 
existence of fraud in a given setting. The researchers in the Albrecht Study drew on more than 50 
government agencies and private sources of information leading to a review of 52 different 
company fraud events. The authors of the Albrecht Study describe its objectives as: 
1) To conduct an extensive review of all fraud-related literature; 
2) To identify individual, organizational, and societal factors that suggest  
    a high probability of fraud; 
3) To validate these factors by comparing them to past cases of fraud; and 
4) To organize the factors into early-warning systems that can be used to  
detect and deter fraud. 
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Other differences also evolved between initial fraud models and later ones. Compared to 
the specific Cressey (1953) hypothesis about embezzlement, the Albrecht Study expands the 
scope of financial crimes considered to a much broader set, including financial statement fraud. 
The output from the Albrecht Study is a list of red flags (indicators) for fraud categorized by: 1) 
situational pressure, 2) opportunity, and 3) personal integrity (Albrecht et al. 1982). These red 
flags are also sub-grouped between personal and company indicators of fraud.
7
 The Albrecht 
Study first identifies potential red flags for fraud and then searches details from known fraud 
cases for confirmation or disconfirmation of the presence of each red flag. Unlike Cressey’s 
(1953) three categories which are considered necessary for fraud, the Albrecht Study describes 
the three categories in the framework of a fraud scale, such that the three categories interact or 
are weighted against one another so that high risk in one or two categories could outweigh lower 
risk in another category (Albrecht et al. 1980; Albrecht et al. 1982; and Albrecht 2014). 
In summary, the original fraud model of Cressey (1953) undergoes a shift in perspective 
in a number of ways after the Albrecht Study (Albrecht et al. 1980; Albrecht et al. 1982), as 
reflected in Exhibit 2, and that shift in perspective survives to the current day fraud triangle 
model used to categorize fraud risk factors in current auditing standards. The original model 
(Cressey 1953) was descriptive of a sample of known fraud events, while today’s fraud triangle 
model is used predictively, in settings where the presence of fraud is unknown. In the original 
model (Cressey 1953) the three elements of fraud existing together concurrently were considered 
prerequisites for the conduct of a fraudulent act, while today’s model is probabilistic and 
presence of any of the elements of fraud are said to be indicators that fraud may exist. In the 
                                                          
7
 The subgroups for personal and company indicators of fraud are similar to the subgroups used for fraud risk factors 
in current auditing standards, which are currently labeled as risk factors arising from misappropriation of assets and 
risk factors arising from fraudulent financial reporting. 
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original fraud model (Cressey 1953) embezzlement was the crime studied, while the current 
fraud triangle model is applied to a wide variety of financial crimes (Albrecht et al. 2012, p. 34), 
including asset misappropriation, corruption and fraudulent financial reporting. In the original 
fraud model (Cressey 1953) the three elements of fraud are unobservable, while in the current 
fraud triangle model fraud risk factors are observable indicators of fraud risk.    
2.2 The “Expectation Gap” Drives Fraud Auditing Standards  
During the 1990s, the expectation gap between auditors and financial statement users 
regarding auditors’ responsibility to detect fraud continued to challenge the auditing profession 
(AICPA 1993). An exposure draft for a new proposed statement on auditing standards, 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA 1996) was issued. The objective 
of this proposed auditing standard was to propose more detailed guidance to auditors on their 
responsibilities for detecting fraud in financial statements. The exposure draft for this standard, 
which eventually became SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997), presents fraud risk factors from both 
academic and practical research (AICPA 1996). The SAS No. 82 fraud risk factor examples are 
the same ones still present in auditing standards today (SAS No. 99, AICPA 2002 in AU 316, 
AU-C 240, and ISA 240). Many of the Albrecht Study red flags for fraud were incorporated into 
these auditing standards. Dr. Albrecht influenced the fraud risk factor content of the SAS No. 82 
exposure draft and final standard through his service on the SAS No. 82 Fraud Task Force which 
made recommendations to the AICPA Auditing Standards Board for this exposure draft. 
However, fraud risk factors in SAS No. 82 were grouped under the following three categories: 1) 
management’s characteristics and influence over the control environment, 2) industry conditions, 
and 3) operating characteristics and financial stability, rather than under the three fraud triangle 
model categories. As a member of the fraud task force, Dr. Albrecht advocated for use of the 
 15 
 
fraud triangle model categories to organize the fraud risk factor examples listed in SAS No. 82, 
but did not prevail because the fraud triangle model was not yet well known, as it is today.
8
 
When SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002), also entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit, superseded SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997), the fraud triangle model became the framework 
for categorizing fraud risk factors in the auditing standard. The example fraud risk factors in SAS 
No. 99 (and still codified in current auditing standards for public company, private company, and 
international standards) are primarily comprised of the same fraud risk factor examples presented 
in SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997).  
2.3 The Incentive/Pressure Fraud Triangle Category 
The text of the SAS No. 82 exposure draft adds discussion of management incentives for 
fraud to that of management pressure for fraud (AICPA 1996, p. 16, 19, 20, 25). In an Arthur 
Andersen (1996) comment letter to this exposure draft, this Big 8 firm recommends that fraud 
risk factors should be categorized under: 1) incentives and pressures, 2) opportunities (or internal 
control vulnerabilities), and 3) integrity of management. This Arthur Andersen recommendation 
was not adopted in the final version of SAS 82. However, the “incentives and pressure” category 
recommendation is consistent with the “incentive/pressure” description for that fraud triangle 
category used to organize fraud risk factor examples in SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002). SAS No. 99 
does not differentiate between incentives or pressures in its categorization of fraud risk factors, 
and SAS No. 99 fraud task force members do not recall differentiating between incentive and 
pressures at the time of their deliberations.
9
 
                                                          
8
 This statement is based on a June 1, 2015 email response to me from Dr. W. Steve Albrecht, reflecting on his 
service on the Fraud Task Force for SAS No. 82. 
9
 Based on email responses to me from the SAS No. 99 Fraud Task Force chair, David Landsittel on May 5, 2015, 
and from Fraud Task Force members Dr. Zoe-Vonna Palmrose on April 29, 2015, and Dr. Mark Beasley on April 
10, 2015.  
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2.4 Criticism of the Fraud Triangle Model 
Although SAS No. 99 does not specifically use the term “fraud triangle,” much of the 
SAS No. 99 auditing standard was inspired by this fraud triangle conceptualization developed 
and promoted by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (“ACFE”) (Morales et al. 2014). 
The ACFE is a significant association of fraud-fighting professionals, with 75,000 members, a 
professional certification program, frequent continuing education seminars and conferences, an 
extensive network of local chapters, and a variety of fraud-fighting publications, including a 
practice journal called Fraud Magazine (ACFE 2015). The ACFE uses this extensive network of 
resources to promote its vision of the fraud triangle, which it legitimizes through its attributions 
to the academic work of criminologist Donald Cressey (Morales et al. 2014). The publication of 
SAS No. 99 in 2002 led to a proliferation of fraud triangle awareness, as evidenced by the 
number of documents referring to the fraud triangle identified in a review of fraud triangle 
literature performed by Morales et al. (2014). They find 223 publications making reference to the 
fraud triangle in academic and business literature from 2002 to 2011, up from 19 references from 
1979 to 2001. Today the accounting standards setters, the Big 4 firms, the accounting profession, 
and the ACFE are actively involved in promoting and diffusing the fraud triangle concept, which 
remains accepted without question,
10
 although Morales et al. (2014) believe that empirical tests 
of the practical effectiveness of the fraud triangle model are scarce and unconvincing. 
Morales et al. (2014) conclude that the fraud triangle has evolved through a series of 
translations and interpretations, and the attributions of the current day fraud triangle to the work 
of Donald Cressey are contradicted by important differences between the fraud triangle used in 
                                                          
10
 Expanded models, such as the fraud diamond (Wolfe 2004) and the fraud pentagon (Crowe Horwath LLP 2016) 
have subsequently been proposed, but these models incorporate the three elements of the fraud triangle and add 
other components. 
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auditing standards and the work originally published by Cressey.
11
 Cressey concluded that the 
motivation for embezzlements was a “nonsharable problem,” while the SAS No. 99 category for 
fraud motivation is “Incentives/Pressures.” While the “nonsharable problems” identified by 
Cressey were private to each embezzler, specific pressures to meet financial targets, incentive 
compensation for meeting such targets, and quantification of the targets themselves at companies 
are often open to observation, especially in public companies. Cressey’s causal view has been 
abandoned in favor of the notion of risk (Morales et al. 2014). This transformation of Cressey’s 
(1953) descriptive, prerequisite, unobservable, embezzlement-specific hypothesis into the 
predictive, probabilistic, observable, broad perspective of the fraud triangle is necessary for 
application of the fraud triangle to an audit environment. There is little evidence to support the 
fraud triangle as a general “theory” of financial crime (Donegan and Ganon 2008). 
 The proceeding critique of the fraud triangle is not intended to discredit its usefulness, 
but rather, to support the need to understand the evolution of the fraud triangle and to ask 
whether there are opportunities to further develop the fraud triangle for application to auditing 
tasks. There is evidence that asking auditors to think more deeply about the fraud triangle when 
assessing risk, by disaggregating risk assessments into the three fraud triangle elements, 
increases auditor sensitivity to fraud risk (Wilks and Zimbelman 2004; Favere-Marchesi 2013). 
This current study evaluates the impact of asking auditors to further disaggregate risk 
assessments for motivation for fraud, the incentive/pressure category of the fraud triangle in 
current auditing standards.  
 
                                                          
11
 The central criticism by Morales et al. (2014) is the fraud triangle model exclusion of sociological explanations of 
fraud such as differential association, a theory about of how fraud is learned from others. 
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2.5 Fraud Risk Factors in Auditing Standards 
 Following the issuance of SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997) the Accounting Standards Board of 
the AICPA committed to study the impact of the standard on auditing practice. Appendix B to 
this study summarizes research published beginning 1986 on subjects related to auditor fraud 
risk assessment and fraud risk factors. Early studies in Appendix B conclude that many fraud risk 
factors proposed were not considered important by auditors (Albrecht and Romney 1986; 
Apostolou et al. 2001), and that a checklist of fraud risks can have a dysfunctional effect on 
auditor consideration of fraud (Pincus 1989). Zimbelman (1997) finds that auditor attention on 
SAS No. 82 fraud risk factors increased attention to fraud uniformly, but the nature of testing by 
auditors was not responsively different to low versus high fraud risk cases.  
The appendix B studies reflect mixed results regarding auditor response to fraud risks 
identified. Auditors often identified increased fraud risk but did not change the nature or extent 
of testing in response to the increased fraud risk (Wright and Bedard 2000; Glover et al. 2003; 
Asare and Wright 2004). Regarding SAS No.99 fraud risk assessment using the fraud triangle 
categories, Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) and Favere-Marchesi (2013) find that disaggregating 
fraud risk assessments into the three fraud triangle categorizations can make auditors more 
sensitive to fraud risks.
12
  Hammersley (2011) finds that auditor responsiveness to fraud risks 
partially depends on the diagnosticity of fraud risk factors and to auditor fraud knowledge.      
When SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002) superseded SAS No. 82 (1997), the fraud triangle 
became integrated into fraud risk assessment guidance in auditing standards. Although current 
auditing standards present the risk factors for fraud motivation as a single category 
                                                          
12
 This finding in both of these studies is in a setting where fraud risk is considered low. In a high fraud risk setting, 
disaggregation of risks into fraud triangle categories is not necessary to elicit relatively greater fraud risk 
assessments. 
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(Incentives/Pressures), this present study investigates whether auditors make different risk 
assessments and auditing decisions when top managers are under a pressure to avoid a potential 
loss, rather than under an incentive for a potential gain. Even in his original work, Cressey 
(1953) recognized a difference between two types of non-sharable problems,
13
 which he called 
“status-seeking/gaining” or “status-maintaining” (Cressey 1953, pp. 36, 53, 75). Status-seeking 
can be fulfilled by realizing an incentive for a potential gain, while status-maintaining is 
characterized by a desire to avoid a potential loss. Cressey found the more common driver of 
embezzlement to be status-maintaining non-shareable problems, rather than status-gaining non-
sharable problems (Cressey 1953, p.53). The root sources of status maintaining non-sharable 
problems included violations of ascribed obligations, problems resulting from personal failure, 
and problems resulting from business reversals (Cressey 1953, pp. 36-52). Status is often 
measured in terms of wealth and compensation. Auditors in this current study are asked to assess 
their perceptions of fraud risks associated with status-gaining incentives for gain, or status-
maintaining pressures of avoiding a potential loss. 
  
                                                          
13
 Gains or losses could be financial or nonfinancial in nature (Cressey 1953, p 35). 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW—EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND FRAUD  
3.1 Consideration of Executive Compensation in Fraud Auditing Standards 
Auditing standards include few fraud risk factor examples that directly reference 
management compensation. An example of a fraud risk factor example focused on compensation 
from SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002, AU 316.85) follows: 
Significant portions of [management’s] compensation (for example, bonuses, stock 
options, and earn-out arrangements) being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets 
for stock price, operating results, financial position, or cash flow. 
 
More recently issued public company auditing standards make additional requirements of 
auditors to consider executive compensation. PCAOB auditing standards concerning auditor 
consideration of executive compensation as a potential motivator of financial statement fraud are 
primarily contained in the following PCAOB standards: (1) AS No. 12 – Identifying and 
Assessing Risks of Material Misstatements (PCAOB 2010a), (2) AS No. 18 – Related Parties, 
Amendments to Certain PCAOB Auditing Standards, and Other Amendments (PCAOB 2014), 
and (3) AS No. 14 – Evaluating Audit Results (PCAOB 2010b). Between 2010 and 2014, the 
PCAOB increased auditing requirements regarding the consideration of executive compensation 
in fraud risk assessment. 
 AS No. 12 (PCAOB 2010a), before being amended in 2014, states that the auditor should 
“consider” performing procedures such as: “Obtaining an understanding of compensation 
arrangements with senior management, including incentive compensation arrangements, changes 
or adjustments to these arrangements, and special bonuses.” (PCAOB 2010a, p. A5 – 5) This 
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standard also highlights the importance of understanding company performance measures, such 
as those that form the basis for contractual commitments or incentive compensation 
arrangements, because these can affect the risk of material misstatement by creating incentives or 
pressures for management to manipulate accounts or disclosures in order to achieve certain 
performance targets. AS No. 12 also reiterates the SAS No. 99 events or conditions representing 
fraud risk factors, including indications of :  “(1) an incentive or pressure to perpetrate fraud, (2) 
an opportunity to carry out the fraud, or (3) an attitude or rationalization that justifies the 
fraudulent action.” (PCAOB 2010a, p. A5 – 27) 
 AS No. 18 (PCAOB 2014) amends the AS No. 12 (PCAOB 2010a) recommendation to 
consider executive compensation, by making it a requirement to obtain an understanding of the 
company’s financial transactions and relationship with its executive officers. The new standard 
states that these procedures should include reading employment and compensation contracts and 
proxy statements involving executive compensation. These procedures are designed to support 
the auditor’s assessment of management bias or risk of material misstatement such as the risk 
that management might seek accounting results solely to boost its own compensation. AS No. 18 
states: “A company’s financial relationships and transactions with its executive officers (as one 
example, executive compensation) can create incentives and pressures for executive officers to 
meet financial targets, which can result in risks of material misstatements of a company’s 
financial statements.” (PCAOB 2014, p.5) 
 AS No. 14 (PCAOB 2010b) also states that qualitative factors to be considered by the 
auditor in evaluation of materiality of uncorrected misstatements include: “A misstatement that 
has the effect of increasing management’s compensation, for example, by satisfying the 
requirements for the award of bonuses or other forms of incentive compensation.” (PCAOB 
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2010b, p. A7 – 17) “Likewise, an understanding of compensation arrangements with senior 
management often can provide important information about incentives and pressures on 
management to manipulate the financial statements.” (PCAOB 2010b, p. A10 – 33) 
3.2 Research on Executive Compensation and Auditing 
 Dikolli et al. (2004) experimentally find that audit risk is assessed relatively higher and 
more extensive audit plans are selected, for clients who pay executive bonuses based on financial 
performance measures, rather than on non-financial performance measures. They cannot 
determine whether these results are attributable to differences between financial versus non-
financial performance measures or to the ease with which financial performance measure could 
be manipulated by management. 
Archival research demonstrates that it is executive ownership of equity positions in the 
company managed, not current compensation and bonuses, which have the most significant 
impact on change in executive wealth at public companies (Hall and Liebman 1998; Core and 
Guay 1999; Core et al. 2003; Billings et al. 2014). This fact implies that stock and option 
ownership incentives should be of interest to auditors assessing fraud risk associated with 
executive compensation incentives.  
Kannan et al. (2014) find no association between audit fees (reflecting the cost, quantity 
and quality of audit effort) and CEO and CFO delta incentives (defined as the sensitivity of the 
change in value of executive stock and option portfolios to changes in stock price).
14
  Billings et 
al. (2014) find that CFO delta equity ownership incentives, but not CEO delta equity ownership 
                                                          
14
 Kannan et al. (2014) also consider the relationship between audit fees and vega incentives (the sensitivity of the 
value of executive stock and option portfolios to stock return volatility). The vega results are mixed and Guay 
(1999) states that vegas are subject to estimation problems and vegas in this context are almost always economically 
insignificant. 
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incentives are associated with audit effort, as proxied by the pricing of audit services, suggesting 
increasing audit risk with increasing CFO equity ownership incentives. CFO influence, measured 
as the proportion of CFO compensation relative to the other top four executives, is also 
associated with audit fees, but premium audit fees are not associated with CEO influence, 
suggesting that auditors perceive a risk of CFOs engaging in earnings manipulations in response 
to their own equity incentives. 
3.3 Research on Executive Compensation and Financial Statement Fraud 
 Numerous studies evaluate various executive compensation components, and whether 
executive compensation is associated with intentional misstatements of company earnings by 
executives. One might expect that top executives could be motivated to overstate company 
earnings in order to increase their own performance-based compensation, such as bonus, stock 
and option grants, and changes in the value of stock and stock options owned. Conversely, a 
highly compensated executive could be reluctant to overstate earnings due to risk of discovery 
and resulting restatements, which might threaten the continued employment of the executive.
15
 
Even when an executive is reluctant to misstate earnings, the size of the impact of earnings on 
certain compensation components could become so large that he/she would succumb to the 
temptation to intentionally cause an earnings misstatement. Figure 3 summarizes studies 
analyzing whether executive compensation is associated with intentional misstatements of 
                                                          
15
 Hennes et al. (2008) find that during the 13 months surrounding a fraud restatements, 49 percent of CEOs and 64 
percent of CFOs turnover their positions (compared to 8 percent and 12 percent, respectively, for error 
restatements). They also find that during a four year period surrounding fraud restatements, 91 percent of companies 
have turnover in either their CEO or CFO.    
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earnings. Overall, these study results are mixed, regarding whether specific compensation 
components are associated with intentional earnings misstatements.
16
   
Bonus Plans 
Holthausen et al. (1995) find that managers manipulate earnings downward during a 
current period once bonuses reach a maximum payout level under a compensation plan for that 
period, consistent with bonus earnings management research by Healy (1985); but unlike Healy 
(1985), Holthausen et al. (1995) do not find that managers manipulate current earnings for a 
period downward when minimum bonus targets are unreachable for that period. However, Core 
et al. (2003) conclude that very little of a CEOs total compensation incentives come from cash 
pay (salary and bonus), and that the largest balance of public company CEO compensations is 
comprised of equity ownership of stock and options of the company managed. This leads one to 
consider the following studies. 
Stock and Stock Options Plans 
 Johnson et al. (2009) study compensation and SEC Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs) and find that the financial reporting misconduct described in 
AAERs is associated with executive stock ownership (but not with executive ownership of 
restricted stock). Erickson et al. (2006) find no association between executive stock and option 
portfolio delta
17
 and AAERs. They conclude that equity holdings do not provide  
                                                          
16
 There is a larger body of research focused on executive compensation and earnings management, in which case a 
bias in reported earnings is unintentional or is not described as fraud. However the earnings management studies 
summarized in Figure 3 are focused on intentional misstatements or indicators of intentional misstatements of 
earnings.  
17
 Portfolio delta is described as the change in a manager’s wealth from stock and option ownership relative to a 
change in price of the stock of the company managed. 
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Figure 3: Summary of Compensation and Fraudulent Financial Reporting Literature  
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incentives to misreport. Johnson et al. (2009) find that stock holdings—not options holdings—
are associated with financial statement fraud. They also find that this management fraud is more 
often committed following declines in company performance. A period of decline in 
performance represents a period when the managed firm is in a loss position relative to an 
expectations reference point of recent earnings levels. This loss position from a reference point is 
consistent with the concept of the loss domain described by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
under prospect theory. 
 Denis et al. (2006) find that stock option incentives to managers are associated with fraud 
allegations against their companies managed. Burnes and Kedia (2006) conclude that the 
sensitivity of CEO option portfolios to stock price (portfolio delta) is positively related to 
propensity to misreport. Other forms of compensation are not found to be associated with 
misreporting. Harris and Bromiley (2007) find that earnings restatements are associated with 
option value as a percent of total compensation for managers. Efendi et al. (2007) find that 
restatements are associated with option intrinsic value and option delta, but that there is no 
association between the CEO’s portfolio delta and restatements. Armstrong et al. (2013) find a 
strong association between vega
18
 effects of compensation and misreporting, which subsumes the 
delta effects of compensation structure.    
 O’Connor et al. (2006) find that option value owned by the CEO is associated with 
restatements under certain conditions: when the CEO is the board chair and sole option holder, 
and when the CEO and other board members receive options. Armstrong et al. (2010) find no 
association between CEO equity compensation portfolio delta and accounting irregularities, and 
                                                          
18
 Armstrong et al. (2013) define vega effects as the sensitivity of a manager’s wealth to changes in stock volatility, 
and defines delta effects as the sensitivity of a manager’s wealth to changes in stock price. 
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find some evidence that irregularities are less frequent at firms where CEO’s have relatively 
higher levels of equity-based compensation. Gillett and Uddin (2005) find that compensation 
structure is not a good indicator of manager intention to misreport, but that CFOs of larger firms 
are more likely to report fraudulently.  
 The contradictory results of these studies comparing compensation components and 
misreporting leads one to seek additional omitted variables as an explanation. Figure 3 reveals 
that many of the studies use restatements as a proxy for fraud, but do not differentiate between 
fraud and nonfraud restatements.
19
 Whether there is management intention to mislead is an 
omitted variable in many of these studies because it is difficult to detect. These study findings 
(except for Johnson et al. 2009) also do not differentiate between periods of increasing or 
decreasing earnings when comparing compensation components to misreporting, and such 
comparisons are difficult because stock and option incentives relate to multiple periods which 
often include both increasing and decreasing earnings periods. Prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979) explains that managers will have a greater motivation to avoid reporting losses 
than to realize equal value gains. So, distinguishing between periods of increasing or decreasing 
earnings in these compensation and fraud studies is also a potential source of omitted variable in 
the analyses.  
 Taken together, the compensation and fraud research demonstrates evidence that various 
compensation components can have a statistically significant association with various proxies for 
financial statement fraud. One goal of this study is to determine whether financial statement 
auditors incorporate their knowledge of top management compensation structure into their fraud 
risk assessments, and what are the benefits of doing so. 
                                                          
19
 The primary factor that distinguishes fraud from error is whether the action that results in a misstatement is 
intentional or unintentional (AICPA, 2002, AU 316.05). 
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4. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
4.1 Fraud Risk Factor Usefulness 
 The terms “red flags for fraud” and “fraud risk factors” have been used interchangeably 
over time, with the term “fraud risk factor” becoming the more common term used upon the 
issuance of SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002). McKey (2010) states that current fraud audit approaches 
are predicated on the belief that specific identified fraud risks, in the form of red flags for fraud, 
help predict overall risk of fraud. Pincus (1989) observes that practitioners and standards setters 
refer to red flags as indicators of fraud. However, Albrecht and Romney (1986) find that of the 
87 red flags that they identify as being used by audit firms in practice at the time, only one-third 
are considered by auditors to be significant predictors of fraud cases. Hogan et al. (2008) reviews 
financial statement fraud literature and observes that while red flags for fraud are observed 
frequently, their presence usually does not lead to a conclusion of fraud. This fact could 
understandably desensitize auditors using red flag checklists. Pincus (1989) and Hogan et al. 
(2008) conclude that red flag checklists for fraud can be dysfunctional because auditors fail to 
expand their thinking beyond the checklist. 
The usefulness of fraud risk factors assessed in auditing literature has depended on what 
risk factors are used and how auditors have used them. Pincus (1989) finds that use of a red flag 
checklist increases the comprehensiveness and uniformity of data acquisition, but in a case where 
fraud is present, auditors using a checklist of red flags assess fraud risk lower than auditors 
without the checklist. Boritz and Timoshenko (2014) conclude that appropriately designed and 
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adequately customized checklists, applied strategically, can be effective. Apostolou et al. (2001) 
asked auditors to rate the relative importance of fraud risk factors from SAS No. 82 (AICPA 
1997),
20
 and they find auditors indicate that factors related to management characteristics and 
influence over the control environment were twice as important as operating and financial 
characteristics of the organization, and were four times more important than industry condition 
characteristics. These relative importance levels attributed to categories of fraud risk factors were 
not significantly different between Big 5 auditors, regional/local auditors and internal auditors, 
and were not related to the years of audit experience. Zimbelman (1997) initially finds that prior 
to the issuance of SAS No. 82, auditors were not sensitive to high versus low fraud risk cases 
when using SAS No. 82 fraud risk factors, but rather, inefficiently increased overall planned 
testing irrespective of fraud risk assessment levels. Glover et al. (2003) find that, two years after 
implementation of SAS No. 82, auditors became more sensitive to differences in fraud risk levels 
indicated by SAS No. 82 fraud risk factors.  
SAS No. 99 reflects nearly all of the same fraud risk factor examples as SAS No. 82, 
except that SAS No. 99 reorganizes them under the three categories of the fraud triangle model: 
opportunity, attitude/rationalization, and incentive/pressure (motivation) to commit fraud. Wilks 
and Zimbelman (2004) find that auditors who make three separate fraud triangle model element 
risk assessments are more sensitive to opportunity and incentive/pressure fraud risk factors than 
auditors that make only a single overall fraud risk assessment. Favere-Marchesi (2013) finds that 
auditors who make three separate fraud triangle model element risk assessments are more 
sensitive to opportunity and incentive/pressure fraud risk factors than are auditors who only 
                                                          
20
 SAS No. 82 was superseded by SAS No. 99 in 2002. Both standards, titled Considerations for Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit, list approximately the same fraud risk factor examples for financial statement fraud, but 
in SAS No. 82, these factors are grouped in the following categories: 1) management’s characteristics and influence 
over the control environment, 2) industry conditions, and 3) operating characteristics and financial stability.   
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categorize fraud risk factors into the three fraud triangle model categories before making a single 
overall fraud risk assessment. 
4.2 Fraud Risk Factor Focus: Individual or Organizational  
The Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) and the Favere-Marchesi (2013) studies measure 
differences in fraud risk assessment ratings between high fraud risk and low fraud risk cases. 
Their definition of high versus low fraud risk is important to the fraud risk factor focus research 
question of this current study. These two prior studies rely on construction of high versus low 
fraud cases based on a pilot study described by Wilks and Zimbelman (2004). This pilot study 
asked 12 practicing audit managers from three of the Big 5 firms to rate the importance of 40 
fraud risk factors obtained from the exposure draft version of SAS No. 99. Risk factors that were 
considered relatively unimportant in the pilot study were used to build the low risk case, while 
risk factors that were considered relatively important in the pilot study were added to build the 
high risk case.  Following are the fraud risk factors presented by Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) in 
the low fraud risk case: 
 High degree of competition, market saturation, or declining margins 
 Significant declines in customer demand 
 Need to obtain debt or equity financing 
 Marginal ability to meet debt repayment or debt covenant requirements. 
 
Following are the fraud risk factors presented by Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) in the high fraud 
risk case: 
 
 Significant portions of management’s compensation being contingent upon aggressive 
targets for stock price, operating results, financial position, or cash flow 
 Management’s personal guarantee of significant debts of the entity 
 Excessive pressure on management to meet financial targets. 
 
When evaluating motivation for fraud, the fraud risk factors considered to be relatively 
unimportant by auditors were ones that describe potential impacts on the organization, while the 
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fraud risk factors considered to be relatively important were ones that that describe potential 
impact on individual managers. Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) do not identify this fact and do not 
explain why auditors view certain fraud risk factors as relatively unimportant, and others as 
relatively important.     
Mental model theory provides a potential explanation for why auditors perceive some 
fraud risk factors as important, while others are perceived as relatively unimportant. “A mental 
model is a representation of some domain or situation that supports understanding, reasoning, 
and prediction” (Markman and Gentner 2001, p228). “To this end, human reasoners tend to 
generate a conclusion that maintains the information conveyed by the premises, that re-express it 
more parsimoniously, and that establish something not originally explicit” (Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne 1991, p194). Mental models are subjective, internal representations of a system of causal 
relations that are qualitative, incomplete and substitute more familiar attributes for attributes that 
would be present in a more formal scientific model (Markman and Gentner 2001; Krishnan et al. 
2005). Mental models are likely to include short causal chains, while omitting steps in longer, 
more complex causal chains (Krishnan et al. 2005). 
A red flag for fraud, or fraud risk factor, is the initial step in an auditor’s mental model 
about a fraud hypothesis. Since a decision to misreport earnings is made by an individual 
manager or managers, not an organization, a fraud risk factor that describes a condition 
impacting the organization invokes a less direct, more complex mental model of misreporting 
motivation than does a fraud risk factor that directly describes a potential impact on individual 
managers. For example, a fraud risk factor could explicitly state that missing an entity earnings 
target that also serves as a CFO compensation benchmark would lead to a decrease in CFO 
compensation. This is a short and direct mental model for misreporting motivation of the CFO.  
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Contrast that example with a more complex one. Consider an observed fraud risk factor of 
increasing industry competitiveness, which would lead to pressure on product pricing, which 
would reduce product margins, which could in turn decrease entity earnings, which are a 
benchmark for CFO compensation targets, which would negatively impact CFO compensation. 
This is a less direct mental model about how the initial fraud risk factor, industry  
 
Figure 4: Direct and Indirect Mental Model Examples 
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competitiveness, could impact CFO motivation to misreport. In an experiment involving 
accounting judgments, Farrell et al. (2007) note that adding links in the causal chain of a mental 
model adds to the complexity of the mental representation, placing greater demands on working 
memory. They also note that an increased number of logical steps within a mental model make it 
more complex and uncertain.  
Most financial statement fraud is perpetrated by, or at least involves, the very top levels 
of management (Beasley et al. 2010; Perri 2013; PCAOB 2014). Considering the mental model 
concept of directness as applied to fraud risk factors and motivation for fraud decisions, and 
considering the lack of reaction to organizational level fraud risk factors in studies (Albrecht and 
Romney 1986; Apostolou 2001; Wilks and Zimbelman 2004), auditors are expected to more 
easily process misreporting risks that directly affect managers responsible for the reporting. 
Conversely, auditors are expected to have more difficulty processing misreporting risks that 
affect the organization, but only indirectly affect managers responsible for reporting. Therefore, 
risks for which the impact on the reporting manager can more easily be processed and identified 
are expected to be rated as relatively greater risks, and risks for which the impact on the 
reporting manager are less easily processed and identified are expected to be rated as relatively 
lower risks.  
4.3 Fraud Risk Factor Motivation Type: Incentive or Pressure 
Studies have identified differences between positive and negative framing of audit 
assertions on auditors’ behavior. Fukukawa and Mock (2011) find that auditors evaluating a 
negatively stated audit assertion (such as: “Test whether there is a material misstatement in the 
recording of sales transactions”) exhibit more skepticism than auditors who are given the same 
audit step stated positively (such as: “Test whether sales transactions are accurately recorded”). 
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Bedard and Graham (2002) find that auditors using a decision aid with a negative orientation 
find more fraud risks than those using a decision aid with a positive orientation. Schema theory 
(Alba and Hasher 1983) explains that expectations brought to a task influence how information is 
used, and more negative expectations lead to relatively more use of negative information. This 
relatively greater attention to negative information is consistent with a prediction that a fraud risk 
factor indicating a pressure to avoid a potential loss will receive a relatively greater risk 
assessment from an auditor than a fraud risk factor indicating incentive for a gain. 
 Additional insight to the preceding explanation for the direction of auditor attention, is to 
understand how loss aversion in human nature can affect management decision-making, and to 
observe whether auditor fraud risk assessments is influenced by differences between incentive 
for a gain versus a pressure of a loss for managers. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979) provides an explanation of individual decision making under risk, which is developed for 
simple prospects with monetary outcomes under uncertainty, but can be extended to more 
involved choices. An essential feature of prospect theory is that decision motivation for potential 
payoff choices are driven by potential changes in wealth or welfare from a given reference point. 
A salient characteristic of attitudes to changes in welfare is that losses loom larger than gains in 
human minds. This is described as a value function (utility per dollar function) that is steeper for 
losses than for gains.  
  Prospect theory can be used to predict that a manager would have a greater motivation to 
avoid declines in compensation, welfare and reputation, than to attain equivalent increases in 
compensation, welfare or reputation. Prospect theory, then, also suggests that a top manager 
facing a decision about whether to misreport earnings would face greater psychological 
motivation to do so under pressure to avoid a negative outcome from a reference point, than 
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under an incentive to produce an equivalent value positive outcome from the same reference 
point. Individual level reference point examples include current level of compensation or wealth. 
Organizational level reference point examples include attaining positive earnings, expected 
earnings or target stock valuation. Studies demonstrate that managers, laborers, gamblers and 
other decision-makers exhibit behavior described by prospect theory in many settings, including: 
finance, insurance, industrial organization, labor supply, negotiations, investing, and other 
settings (Barberis 2013). This dissertation seeks not to predict management behavior, but rather, 
to determine whether auditor evaluation of fraud risk factors is intuitively influenced by these 
prospect theory explanations of human loss aversion that could affect the degree of management 
motivation to misreport. 
 It is reasonable to ask whether an auditor’s intuition about human nature could impact 
his/her thinking about auditee manager motivation. Kahneman (2011) describes that humans 
exhibit two systems of thinking. The fast system, or System 1, operates automatically and 
quickly, with little or no effort or sense of voluntary control. System 1 is driven by both emotion 
and unconscious recall of human experience. The slow system, or System 2, allocates attention 
to the effortful mental activities that are demanded of it, including logic and computations. The 
difference in auditor assessment of management’s motivation driven by the desire to avoid a 
potential loss, rather than realize a potential gain, is expected to relate to the auditors own 
unconscious knowledge of human loss aversion as controlled by System 1 thinking.  
4.4 Interaction of Fraud Risk Factor Focus and Motivation Type 
 Prospect theory explains risk-reward decision-making of individuals and suggests that 
auditors would assess pressures of loss impacting individual top managers differently than 
incentives for a gain to those managers. However, as described in the preceding Fraud Risk 
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Factor Focus section of this paper, the mental model for fraud motivation is more direct for risk 
factors focused on managers, and less direct for risk factors focused on the organization 
generally. This concept of mental model directness suggests that any difference between auditor 
perception of misreporting risk under pressure versus incentive would be least difficult to 
identify when fraud risk factors are focused directly on top managers, and more difficult to 
identify when fraud risk factors are focused on the organization. Therefore, whether fraud risk 
factors indicating pressures are assessed as higher risks than those indicating incentives, should 
depend on whether the fraud risk factor is focused on the organization or on individual top 
managers, leading to the following interaction hypotheses for risk assessment: 
H1a:  Auditors will assess motivation-for-misreporting risks as being greater 
when they are framed as pressures to avoid potential losses than when they 
are framed as incentives for potential gains, when these risks are focused 
on top managers, but not when they are focused on the organization. 
 
Likewise, the link between risk assessment and audit planning leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1b:  Auditors will make more extensive risk-responsive audit planning 
decisions when motivation-for-misreporting risks are framed as pressures 
to avoid potential losses rather than when they are framed as incentives for 
potential gains, when these risks are focused on top managers, but not 
when they are focused on the organization. 
 
 
 
4.5 Incentive and Pressure in Executive Compensation 
  
 Agency theory supports linking top executive wealth to the value of the firm being 
managed in order to reduce costs that arise when agents (managers) pursue their own interests 
rather than the interests of the owners (shareholders) of the firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
This alignment is achieved when compensation for top managers is structured in such ways that 
payoffs to top managers are highly aligned with financial performance payoffs to the 
organization and its shareholders. When payoffs are so aligned, auditors should assess fraud risk 
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factors focused on the organization as being one-and-the-same as fraud risk factors focused on 
individual top managers. However, the indirectness of the mental model for fraud motivation for 
risk factors focused on the organization, if great enough, will prevent auditors from incorporating 
their knowledge of high executive compensation alignment into auditor risk assessments. 
Auditors should incorporate the degree of compensation alignment into their judgments and 
decision-making processes, but the indirectness of the mental model for compensation incentives 
and pressures supports a prediction that they will not. Therefore, H2a predicts that auditors will 
not incorporate knowledge of high compensation alignment between the organization and top 
managers, and will assess organizationally focused risk factors no differently than when there is 
minimal compensation alignment between the organization and its top managers. The term 
“highly aligned” (“minimally aligned”) in hypotheses 2a and 2b means that compensation 
payoffs to top managers are highly aligned (minimally aligned) with financial statement payoffs 
to the organization and its shareholders/owners.     
H2a:  When fraud risk factors are focused on the organization, auditors will 
assess motivation-for-fraud risk no differently, whether top manager 
compensation is highly aligned or minimally aligned.  
 
 
Similarly, H2b predicts that when management has high compensation alignment auditors will 
make audit planning decisions which are no different than when management has low 
compensation alignment. 
H2b:  When fraud risk factors are focused on the organization, auditors will 
make audit planning decisions that are no different, whether top 
manager compensation is highly aligned or minimally aligned.  
 
These hypotheses will be tested in an experimental setting described in the following section. 
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5. RESEARCH METHOD 
5.1 Participants 
 Recruitment of experimental participants was initiated by request to the alumni advisory 
council boards to the schools of accountancy at two public universities, one in the southeastern 
U.S. and one in the central U.S. Representatives of public accounting firms serving on these 
advisory boards agreed to email a link for the online study instrument to auditing/assurance 
seniors, managers and senior managers at their firms. Under this distribution method, eight 
partners and two staff level positions also completed the study instrument and their results are 
included in analysis. One firm elected not to participate in the electronic distribution of the 
research study, but instead, had 31 senior associates complete a paper version of the study at an 
annual training meeting conducted by the firm. This distribution and collection of the paper 
version of the instrument was conducted by the principal investigator and author of this study. 
The electronic and paper instruments are identical, except as described under the “Experimental 
Instrument” subheading to follow. The manipulated treatment conditions in this between subjects 
experiment were randomly distributed to participants under both, the electronic and the paper 
instrument delivery processes for the study.  
 Participants are 132 auditing/assurance professionals from U.S. offices of public 
accounting firms.
21
 Sixty-two (47.3%) are employed by Big 4 firms; 59 (45.0%) by national or 
                                                          
21
 Participant demographic statistics and percent of total statistics are based on 131 responses to the demographic 
questions. A total of 137 participants started the experiment, but five of those did not complete a sufficient portion 
of the experiment to enable collection of a single dependent variable. 
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regional firms; and 10 (7.7%) by single office firms. The mean years of public accounting 
experience is 5.8 years, with the following breakdown by position: 
 
One hundred twenty participants (91.6%) report that their firms conduct audits of public 
companies while the remainder of participants were unsure or did not respond. Sixty eight 
(51.9%) reported having worked on at least one engagement in a public company setting within 
the past year. Participants report a mean of 3.0 as the number of engagements during their career 
in which they have investigated potentially material misstatements of earnings that were 
suspected to have been intentional. The audit experience of the participants qualifies them for the 
context of this study. There are no significant differences in dependent variable means across 
position levels. 
 Table 2 that follows reflects that there was not a significant difference in mean 
motivation-for-fraud risk assessments between Big 4 and non-Big 4 firm participants. However, 
there were significant differences between these two groups for five of eight dependent variable 
measures of auditor decisions. 
Table 1: Number of Public Accounting Firm Participants by Position and Firm Size
National/ Single
Total Big 4 Regional Office
Participants Firms Firms Firms
Staff 2 1 0 1
Senior 71 47 19 5
Manager 33 10 20 3
Senior Manager 15 3 11 1
Director 2 0 2 0
Partner 8 1 7 0
    Total 131 62 59 10
Participants From
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Table 2: Dependent Variable Measures for Big 4 versus Non-Big 4 Firm Participants   
                           
Of 132 participants completing the study, 68 elected to enter an appreciation drawing at 
the end of the study. Participants who volunteered to enter the appreciation drawing were 
directed to a separate website to enter contact information for entering the drawing. A total of 
eight participants out of 68 were winners of the appreciation drawing, each receiving a $250 gift 
card. 
5.2 Experimental Instrument Format and Delivery 
 Most participants completed the study by accessing a website link emailed to them by a 
senior member of their firm. The electronic version of the study was administered with software 
(Standard (Standard Mean
Dependent Variables (a) Mean deviation) n = Mean deviation) n = Difference Sig. (b)
Motivation-for-fraud risk assessment 7.7 (1.6) 61 8.1 (1.4) 69 (.4) .145
Number of positive confirmations to distributors 51 (31) 60 51 (29) 69 0 .989
Percentage of positive confirmations to
   distributors (% of total confirmations) 47% (.07) 59 49% (.08) 69 (2%) .175
Difference in % of sub cash examined
    for A/R from dist. less from non-dist. 1% (.04) 61 3% (.07) 69 (2%) .134
Number of days past year-end to
    examine subsequent cash receipts 54 (15) 61 59 (13) 69 (5) .026 *
Number of days past year-end to
    examine sales returns 53 (15) 61 58 (13) 69 3 .046 *
Hours budgeted for computer automated audit
    techniques or forensic accounting procedures 22 (34) 62 10 (8) 69 24 .004 *
Hours budgeted to conduct interviews of client
    personnel about sales and accounts receivable 9 (9) 61 5 (4) 69 4 .000 *
Hours budgeted for all sales/accounts receivable
    audit procedures 123 (25) 61 112 (25) 68 11 .011 *
(a) The dependent variables are explained further in this Research Method section of this paper.
(b) This is the ANOVA F-test significance level for the difference in means between Big 4 and non-Big 4 firm participants.
* Indicates a significant difference tests at an alpha of .05.
Non-Big 4 Firm ParticipantsBig 4 Firm Participants
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from Qualtrics.com. Experimental materials included a brief company case,
22
 three audit work 
papers listing fraud risk factors previously deemed present or not present by a hypothetical audit 
team, and a series of requests for decisions regarding certain audit parameters for the audit of 
accounts receivable and sales of the company presented in the case. The instrument concludes 
with questions about participant experience and manipulation check questions. The paper version 
of the instrument is included in Appendix C to this paper. The only difference between the paper  
Table 3: Dependent Variable Measures for Paper versus Electronic Instrument Users
   
                                                          
22 This case is based on a company fraud case from an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (Bausch 
and Lomb in 1997), and is similar to cases modified for a variety of auditor research by Wilks and Zimbelman 
(2004), Carpenter (2007), Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009), Hammersley et al. (2010), and Favere-Marchesi (2013). 
The case was updated to a current time period and the industry setting was modified.   
(Standard (Standard Mean
Dependent Variables (a) Mean deviation) n = Mean deviation) n = Difference Sig. (b)
Motivation-for-fraud risk assessment 7.53 (1.61) 30 8.06 (1.47) 101 (.53) .774
Number of positive confirmations to distributors 55 (40) 29 50 (27) 100 5 .424
Percentage of positive confirmations to
   distributors (% of total confirmations) 48% (.05) 28 48% (.08) 100 0 .992
Difference in % of sub cash examined
    for A/R from dist. less from non-dist. 1% (.03) 30 3% (.07) 100 (2%) .310
Number of days past year-end to
    examine subsequent cash receipts 52 (10) 30 58 (15) 100 (6) .068
Number of days past year-end to
    examine sales returns 52 (10) 30 57 (15) 100 (5) .062
Hours budgeted for computer automated audit
    techniques or forensic accounting procedures 26 (43) 31 12 (15) 100 14 .008 *
Hours budgeted to conduct interviews of client
    personnel about sales and accounts receivable 9 (7) 30 6 (7) 100 3 .030 *
Hours budgeted for all sales/accounts receivable audit
    audit procedures 127 (26) 30 114 (25) 99 13 .019 *
(a) The dependent variables are explained further in this Research Method section of this paper.
(b) This is the ANOVA F-test significance level for the difference in means between participants using the electronic version versus paper version of the instrument.
* Indicates a significant difference tests at an alpha of .05.
Paper Instruments Electronic Instruments
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version and electronic version of the instrument is present on the top of page six of the 
instrument in Appendix C. Under the heading “RECAP” participants receiving hard copy 
instruments are asked to look back to pages 3, 4, and 5 of the instrument to review three of their 
prior fraud risk assessments, before making one final overall fraud risk assessment. In the 
electronic version of the instrument, these three prior risk assessments by the participant were 
automatically reported for review by participants on page 6, before they made an overall fraud 
risk assessment. 
 Table 3 above reflects that there was not a significant difference in mean motivation-for-
fraud risk assessments between participants using the paper or electronic version of the 
instrument. However, there were significant differences between these two groups for three of 
eight dependent variable measures of auditor decisions. The final three dependent variables for 
budgeted hours were significantly larger for participants using the paper version of the 
instrument, rather than the electronic version of the instrument. These hourly budget dependent 
variables were also significantly larger for the Big 4 firm participants relative to non-Big 4 firm 
participants in Table 2 above. All 31 participants that used the paper version of the instrument 
were from a Big 4 firm, where the instrument was administered in a single sitting. The results in 
the comparisons in Tables 2 and 3 support the conclusion that Big 4 firm auditors budget 
relatively higher numbers of hours for auditing sales and accounts receivable in this setting than 
do non-Big 4 firm auditors.   
This company case describes a public company traded on the NASDAQ which exhibits 
evidence of intentional premature revenue recognition through distributor channel stuffing
23
 
strategies implemented by management. Increases in current period revenue and receivables are 
                                                          
23 Channel stuffing is an overstatement of sales achieved through shipment of unwanted inventory to customers, 
which could be subject to return in a later period, or which violate other revenue recognition criteria. 
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evident in the case, and management explains that marketing programs instituted prior to year-
end have incented distributors to accelerate purchases. It is unclear whether these purchases 
might be subject to return or accounts receivable collection problems in the subsequent period. 
Experimental materials were identical for all participants except for the conditions manipulated 
between groups. 
5.3 Manipulation of Fraud Risk Factors for Fraud Motivation 
The fraud risk factors on the incentives/pressures work paper were manipulated into four 
different groups using two experimental factors: 1) fraud motivation focus (organizational or top 
management) and 2) fraud motivation type (incentive or pressure), resulting in the following four 
experimental groups:      
 Group A) Incentive for a potential gain to the organization    
 Group B) Pressure of a potential loss to the organization 
 Group C) Incentive for a potential gain to individual top managers 
 Group D) Pressure of a potential loss to individual top managers 
 
The fraud risk factors (FRFs) presented to each of the four participant groups are listed in Figure 
5. Each FRF is based on a FRF example found in SAS No. 99. The first FRF considers a high 
degree of competition or market saturation. The second FRF considers guarantees of entity debt. 
The third FRF considers a marginal ability to meet debt covenant requirements. The fourth FRF 
considers sales and profitability goals.   
For each FRF in Figure 5, there are four versions, one for each experimental group (A, B, 
C, and D). Each FRF is rewritten from four different perspectives to achieve the fraud risk factor 
focus and motivation type necessary for each group manipulation. Each version of a fraud  
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Figure 5, Panel A: Manipulation of the First Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Factor 
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Figure 5, Panel B: Manipulation of a Second Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Factor 
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Figure 5, Panel C: Manipulation of a Third Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Factor 
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Figure 5, Panel D: Manipulation of a Fourth Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Factor   
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risk factor is written as identically as possible, except for the variation needed to produce the 
focus and type manipulation for each group
24
. Page six, in Appendix C, reflects how the  
motivation-for-fraud risk factors were presented to participants. The instrument presented in 
Appendix C is for group D participants.    
5.4 Manipulation of Compensation Alignment 
Top management compensation is manipulated between two conditions—minimal 
compensation alignment and high compensation alignment. Groups A, B, C and D, previously 
described, receive a minimal compensation alignment treatment, while groups E and F receive a 
highly aligned compensation treatment. Groups A, B, C, and D have a top management 
compensation structure characterized as resulting in minimal alignment between performance 
payoffs to top managers and financial statement earnings payoffs to the organization. This 
minimally aligned compensation structure is 70 percent fixed compensation that will not vary 
with company earnings, and also includes stock and options ownership by these executives, 
which is valued at less than one times total annual compensation. Communication of this 
treatment condition in the instrument is reflected in  Figure 6. 
  
                                                          
24
 Some of the fraud risk factor manipulations include an identical percentage increase or decrease in an outcome for 
the organization or for top manager(s). Whether the identical value percentage manipulation for the organization and 
for a manager represents an actual equal value payoff to a decision-making manager is ambiguous because it 
depends on the level of stock ownership by the manager, and potentially, other unidentified factors. The perceived 
equality of these manipulations depends on the assumption that auditors make fraud risk assessments under what 
Kahneman (2011) calls “System 1” thinking, which is experience- and emotion-based, automatic, and quick, not 
under “System 2” thinking, which is slower and effortful, supporting logical calculations. The fact that a percentage 
change in a payoff to the organization would potentially impact multiple stakeholders, but the same percentage 
change applied directly to a manager would only impact one or a few managers, means that any such perceived 
inequality in the manipulation would work against the direction of the hypothesized experimental group 
relationships.     
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Figure 6: Treatment for Low Compensation Alignment with Payoffs to the Organization  
 
 
Figure 7: Treatment for High Compensation Alignment with Payoffs to the Organization 
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By comparison, groups E and F receive the Figure 7 alternative treatment, highly aligned 
compensation, which is characterized by top managers with 30% fixed compensation and 70% 
variable compensation from bonus, stock and option grants. Additionally, managers in the highly 
aligned compensation condition own stock and options valued at more than 13 times total annual 
compensation. Since the value of the stock and option portfolio is dependent on company 
earnings, this variable compensation structure, including relatively large stock and options 
ownership, make the compensation performance payoffs to top managers highly aligned with the 
financial statement earnings payoffs to the organization, because earnings growth increases the 
value of the stock and options, which increases top manager income and wealth. 
The minimally aligned and the highly aligned compensation conditions
25
 both reflect 
total annual compensation for the top five executives of $3.5 million, but the minimally aligned 
condition is comprised primarily of fixed compensation, while the highly aligned condition 
primarily reflects variable compensation dependent on organizational earnings levels.  
The compensation alignment experimental factor is especially of interest when 
considered in combination with auditor assessment of organizationally focused FRFs. Although a 
full 2 x 2 x 2 interaction of the three experimental factors (FRF focus, FRF type and 
compensation alignment) would result in eight experimental groups, two of these groups are not 
needed to answer the research questions and hypotheses. Interest in the research questions of this 
                                                          
25
 The compensation manipulation amounts are based on the actual relative compensation amounts of the top five 
managers on which the case was based, adjusted for the two manipulated conditions based on cash and non-cash 
compensation from a large sample of ExecuComp data analyzed in Core et al. (2003, p. 965). The minimally aligned 
compensation condition is based on the relatively higher cash pay level of the upper quartile for CEO compensation, 
plus the relatively lower stock and option grant and ownership level of the lower quartile for CEO non-cash 
compensation. The highly aligned compensation condition is based on the relatively lower cash compensation level 
of the lower quartile for CEO pay, plus the relatively higher stock and option grant and ownership level of the upper 
quartile for CEO non-cash compensation. While these two conditions could have been created using hypothetical 
assumptions, the approach based on Core et al. (2003) provides some generalizability for the two experimental 
conditions created.   
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study results in consideration of two additional experimental groups E and F, resulting in six 
total experimental groups:  
 Group A) Incentive for a potential gain to the organization (low compensation alignment)    
 Group B) Pressure of a potential loss to the organization (low compensation alignment) 
 Group C) Incentive for a potential gain to individual top managers (low compensation alignment) 
 Group D) Pressure for a potential loss to individual top managers (low compensation alignment) 
 Group E) Incentive for a potential gain to the organization   (high compensation alignment) 
 Group F) Pressure of a potential loss to the organization (high compensation alignment) 
 
5.5 Auditor Judgment Dependent Variable and Covariates  
During the experiment each participant assesses fraud risk factors on the opportunities 
work paper, the attitude/rationalization work paper and the fraud motivation work paper, using a 
scale from 1 (low risk) to 10 (high risk). The risk assessment for each individual risk factor 
represented by bubbles labeled “1” to “10” in the instrument is not a variable in the study, but 
rather, represents additional information in the case, and the participant risk assessment of each 
fraud risk factor maximizes attention to these case facts. The participant’s overall motivation-for-
fraud risk assessment made on the incentive/pressure work paper is the dependent variable of 
interest used to compare auditor judgment under alternative fraud risk factor framings. The 
overall opportunity-for-fraud risk assessment and overall attitude/rationalization-for-fraud risk 
assessment represent potential covariates for analysis. The opportunity risk (set as high risk for 
all participants) and the attitude/rationalization risk (set as low risk for all participants), together 
should frame a range of responses to risk, resulting in a more consistent measure for each 
participant for the next risk assessment made in the experiment, the one for the dependent 
variable, risk assessment for overall fraud motivation. Risk assessment variables for opportunity 
and for attitude/rationalization are candidates for ANCOVA model covariates, to account for 
variance attributed solely to differences in participant risk scale calibration.  
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5.6 Auditor Decision Dependent Variables 
One common research question explored in auditing literature is: “Will auditors make 
audit planning decisions that are responsive to their risk assessments?” (Pincus 1989; Zimbelman 
1997; Wright and Bedard 2000; Johnstone and Bedard 2001; Bedard and Graham 2002; Glover 
et al. 2003; Asare and Wright 2004; Wilkes and Zimbelman 2004; Mock and Turner 2005; 
Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009; Hammersley 2011; and Favere-Marchesi 2013). These studies 
find mixed evidence of auditor responsiveness to risk assessments under various conditions, and 
some find limited or no responsiveness to risk assessments (Zimbelman 1997; Wright and 
Bedard 2000; Johnstone and Bedard 2001; Glover et al. 2003; and Asare and Wright 2004; 
Wilkes and Zimbelman 2004). Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) believe that they detect more 
risk-responsive audit decisions in an experiment by providing a more specific case context for 
audit decisions. Procedures based on this experiment by Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) were 
used in this current experiment to measure and compare audit decision-making by participants. 
This portion of the instrument consists of a series of audit parameters planned for audit of 
accounts receivable and revenue in the case. These parameters include: 
 Number of positive accounts receivable confirmations to distributors 
 Percentage of positive accounts receivable confirmations to distributors as a percent of 
total confirmations 
 Difference in the percentage of subsequent cash receipts examined for accounts 
receivable from distributors, less those from non-distributors 
 Number of days past year-end to examine subsequent cash receipts 
 Number of days past year-end to examine sales returns 
 Hours budgeted for computer automated audit techniques or forensic accounting 
procedures 
 Hours budgeted to conduct interviews of client personnel about sales and accounts 
receivable 
 Hours budgeted for all sales/accounts receivable audit procedures 
  
 53 
 
Each of these parameters is a dependent variable for analysis of auditor decision making in 
hypotheses 1b and 2b. Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) developed these dependent variables by 
consulting with three national fraud expert partners from three different international public 
accounting firms about benchmark planning decisions that would be effective procedures for 
detecting the fraud in this case. Each audit parameter used for the hypothetical prior year audit of 
the company is revealed, and participants are asked to make an independent decision for each 
parameter for the current year audit, considering their risk assessments and other facts from the 
case. Consistent with Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009), this experiment anticipates that auditors 
tend to use the heuristic of defaulting to last year’s audit plan (Bedard 1989), so a change in the 
current year audit parameter value represents a modification to the nature, timing or extent of 
testing by the auditor. The following excerpts from Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) explain the 
reasoning behind use of these auditor decision variables in their experiment, as adopted in this 
dissertation research. 
 Accounts Receivable Confirmations 
 Our experts recommend that it is far more effective to send positive rather than 
negative confirmations and, because fraud is in the distributor accounts, the 
confirmations should focus on these accounts. Our dependent measures to test for these 
recommendations are (1) the number of positive confirmations to distributors and (2) the 
percentage of positive confirmations to distributors of total confirmations. Since the 
fraud involves sales and accounts receivable within a subset of customers (i.e., 
distributors), we test whether our groups vary the nature of their confirmation evidence 
by focusing their confirmations on distributors. Thus, auditors who emphasize positive 
confirmations to distributors, as opposed to just sending more confirmations overall, 
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effectively vary the nature of their confirmation evidence to detect suspected fraud. We 
use two measures to capture these recommendations because the number of positive 
confirmations to distributors could increase if there is an increase in the extent of testing 
(e.g., sending more confirmations overall without focusing on distributor accounts). Also, 
the percentage of positive confirmations to distributors of total confirmations could 
increase for reasons that are not part of the experts’ recommendations (e.g., a decrease 
in other confirmations rather than an increase in positive confirmations to distributors). 
Thus, these two measures test whether the auditors change the nature of their procedures 
as the experts recommend.
26
 
Subsequent Cash Receipts and Sales Returns 
 The experts recommend that the auditor extends the periods for examining 
subsequent cash receipts and sales returns after year-end. For each of these items, we 
inform participants that last year the period examined was from January 1
st
 to February 
15
th
 and ask them for the period they want to examine this year.
27
As a result, we have two 
separate dependent measures that involve the number of days past year-end: one for 
subsequent cash receipts and one for sales returns. . . . On the other hand, if the auditor 
is concerned that distributors will be slower to pay for “channel stuffed” sales and/or 
return the sales after a relatively long time period because of a side agreement, the 
auditor would change the window for examining both cash receipts and sales returns
28
.  
 Our experts also recommend that the audit plan should focus the review of 
subsequent cash receipts on the distributor cash balances as opposed to the other 
                                                          
26
 Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009, p. 827) 
27
 For the current study, the prior year subsequent receipts period is abbreviated to “45 days used last year.”  
28
 Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009, p. 827) 
 55 
 
account balances. We ask participants, “What percentage of the A/R balances from 
distributors do you want to examine subsequent cash receipts for this year?” We also ask 
for the corresponding percentage for the other accounts. We use the difference in the 
percentages as our dependent measure. This variable captures the type of customer (i.e. 
distributor or other) participants plan to focus on in their subsequent cash receipts 
tests.
29
 
Other Auditing Procedures 
 Our experts suggest that participants should use other procedures, such as interviews 
of client personnel and Computer Assisted Audit Techniques (CAATs), to determine 
unusual relationships and items such as fictitious addresses on confirmations. Our 
dependent measures for these two recommendations are the number of hour budgeted to 
perform the interviews or the CAATs. Note that last year zero hours were budgeted for 
each of these procedures, so if auditors budget any hours for these procedures, they are 
changing the nature of the audit plan. Of course, they are also changing the extent of 
their testing by budgeting more hours.
30
     
5.7 Experimental Procedures 
In Part I of the case participants are asked to assume the role of an audit manager newly 
assigned to an audit of the company. After reading the company background, all participants are 
asked to assess fraud risk related to three risk assessment work papers for opportunities for fraud, 
attitudes/rationalization for fraud, and incentives/pressure (motivation) for fraud, which risks 
were previously identified as being present at the company by their staff assigned to the audit 
                                                          
29
 Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009, pp. 827, 828) 
30
 Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009, p. 828) 
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engagement. Information is also presented about the degree of compensation alignment between 
payoffs to top managers relative to earnings payoffs to the organization. These fraud risk 
assessments are being made during audit planning, prior to client year-end. Then an overall fraud 
risk assessment is made. In Part II of the case, information from analytical procedures and 
management explanations for growth in sales and accounts receivable are provided. Then the 
values for prior year audit procedures are revealed (such as number of confirmations to send and 
days past year-end to review subsequent receipts and returns), and participants are asked to make 
a series of decisions about audit parameters to use in the current year audit, while striving to 
achieve both efficiency and effectiveness. Lastly, demographic questions and manipulation 
check questions are asked of the participants.  
5.8 Planned Contrasts Analysis 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that when fraud risk factors are focused on top managers, mean 
dependent variable values will exceed those when fraud risk factors are focused on the 
organization. Hypothesis 2 predicts that when fraud risk factors are framed as a pressure of a 
loss, mean dependent variables will exceed those measured when fraud risk factors are framed as 
an incentive for a gain. Hypothesis 3 predicts that an ordinal interaction will occur such that 
dependent variables for pressure of a loss will be relatively greater than those for incentive for a 
gain, when fraud risk factors are focused on top managers, rather than on the organization. If 
these hypotheses hold true, group D means will exceed those of A, B and C. Whether group C 
means will exceed group A means is not predicted, but will be tested. These expected 
relationships between group means are illustrated in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Predicted Group Relationships from Hypotheses 1a 
The second set of hypotheses predicts that auditors will not incorporate their knowledge 
of a highly aligned executive compensation structure into the fraud risk assessment process. In 
H2a dependent variable measures for cells E and F are predicted to be equal to those of cells A 
and B. This expected relationship is depicted in Figure 9. The compensation condition for groups 
A, B, C and D in Figures 8 and 9 is minimal alignment between payoffs to top managers and to 
the organization and its shareholders. Management compensation for these groups is primarily 
fixed and change in stock price will have a minimal impact on top manager compensation and 
wealth from stock and option holdings of top managers. The compensation condition for groups 
E and F in Figure 9 is high alignment between payoffs to top managers and to the organization 
and its shareholders. Management compensation for these groups is primarily variable, and 
changes in stock price will have a valuation effect on stock and options holdings of top 
managers. Under the high alignment effect of the group E and F conditions, auditors should have 
similar fraud risk assessments as when fraud risk factors are focused directly on top managers. 
However, Hypothesis 2a predicts that fraud risk assessments for high compensation alignment 
groups E and F will be equal to those of low compensation alignment groups A and B. 
Hypothesis 2b predicts that the extent of auditor decisions for high compensation alignment 
Top Manager Focus
Dependent
Variables
Organizational Focus
Incentive Pressure
for Gain of Loss
A B
C
D
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groups E and F will be equal to those of low compensation alignment groups A and B, and not 
equal to those of groups C and D. 
Figure 9: Predicted Group Relationships from Hypothesis 2a 
Buckless and Ravenscroft (1990) describe that contrast coding—a refinement of 
ANOVA—is a more powerful test than traditional ANOVA for detecting this type of ordinal 
interaction depicted in Figures 8 and 9. The increased power of contrast coding decreases the 
likelihood of incorrectly finding non-hypothesized effects, strengthens the probability of 
detecting hypothesized effects when they exist, and avoids increasing the likelihood of Type I 
errors (Buckless and Ravenscroft, 1990). Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) employ contrast 
coding to analyze expected ordinal interactions similar to the ones predicted in this current 
experiment. 
 Hypotheses comparison of group means for auditor risk assessments will be examined 
using ANCOVA, contrast coding and limited t-tests for differences in group means. Given the 
ordinal interactions predicted, the expectation that group D means will exceed those of groups A, 
B and C, is tested with separate contrast weight tests:  -1, -1, -1, 3; -1, -1, 2, 0; and -1, 1, 0, 0 for 
groups A, B, C, D, respectively. These tests will reveal any ordinal differences between group 
means that exist.  
Top Manager Focus (Low Compensation Alignment)
Dependent
Variables Organizational Focus (High Compensation Alignment)
Organizational Focus (Low Compensation Alignment)
Incentive Pressure
for Gain of Loss
A B
C
D
E
F
 59 
 
 The multiple dependent variables collected for different audit planning decisions tested in 
H1b are described in the “Auditing Decision Dependent Variables” section above. Given the 
ordinal interactions predicted, the expectation that group D means will exceed those of groups A, 
B and C, is tested with contrast weight tests described above for groups A, B, C, D, respectively. 
When no evidence exists for interaction effects for auditor decision dependent variables, main 
effects will be tested. 
The dependent variables used in H1b and H2b are the same auditor decision dependent 
variables used by Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009). Significant group differences in every 
dependent variable are not required in order to demonstrate the auditor response to risk, as some 
audit procedures could be performed as alternatives to others, depending on the judgment of the 
auditor. Audit procedures corroborating the existence of accounts receivable can include a 
variety of audit procedures, including third party confirmation, the use of a specialist, analytical 
procedures, examination of documentation from independent sources (such as subsequent 
collections), or inquiries of others within or outside the entity (AICPA 2002, AU 316.46). The 
greater the number of dependent variable audit procedures modified by auditor participants, the 
more extensive is the auditor response to fraud risk posed in the case. 
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6. RESULTS 
 Before discussing results from tests of hypotheses, participant reaction to the case and 
manipulation checks are presented. All participant groups correctly perceive the case to be a 
relatively high fraud risk case. The mean risk assessment for total fraud risk for the six treatment 
groups range from 7.2 to 7.7 on a ten-point scale, 10 being the greatest risk of fraud. There were 
no significant differences in the mean assessment of overall fraud risk between treatment groups 
(Global F-statistic = .434, p-value = .824).
31
 
6.1 Manipulation Checks 
 Manipulation check questions were asked of participants after all other experimental 
responses were collected. Eighty-four percent of participants recall whether the motivation-for- 
fraud risk factors they assess are focused on top managers or on the company. Eighty-eight 
percent of participants recall whether the motivation-for-fraud risk factor outcomes they assess 
are potential rewards for goals achieved (incentives for gains) or potential penalties for goals not 
achieved (pressure of loss). Ninety-three percent of participants recall whether the management 
compensation structure is primarily fixed, with stock and option ownership equal to less than one 
times cash salary, or primarily variable with stock and option ownership exceeding 13 times 
                                                          
31
 Although there is not a significant difference between groups for overall risk assessed, there are significant 
differences between groups reflected in hypothesis testing for motivation-for-fraud risk assessments and audit 
decisions. Supplemental analysis reflect that many participants tend to average their risk assessments for their three 
fraud triangle risk assessments (opportunity, attitude/rationalization, and incentive/pressure/motivation), when 
determining their overall risk assessment. This averaging effect makes overall risk assessments by participants from 
different groups more similar, even though there are significant differences between group motivation-for-fraud risk 
assessments, primarily for Group D, which observes pressure on top manager fraud risk factors.  
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annual cash salary. Significance of results is not different when eliminating participants who fail 
manipulation checks. For purposes of analysis, all participant data are reflected in results.  
6.2 Significance Criteria and Data Assumptions 
 An alpha of p = .05 is used for tests of significance for tests performed. Each 
experimental group dependent variable is tested for the equality of variance ANOVA assumption 
using Levene’s test, and is tested for a normality of distribution assumption using visual 
inspection of the frequency distributions of dependent variable measures for each group. 
Levene’s tests provide evidence supporting the equality of variance assumption for the auditor 
judgment dependent variable and for some, but not all, of the auditor decision dependent 
variables. The p-values in tests are adjusted to account for unequal variances of the dependent 
variable across groups, when necessary. The visual inspections of dependent variable 
distributions appear normal, except that the distributions appear to be non-normal for three 
dependent variables reflecting budgeted audit hours. No conclusions are based on significant 
findings utilizing these three budgeted hour dependent variables.  
6.3 Tests of Auditor Judgment Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1a predicts that when considering financial statement fraud risks, auditor 
assessment of motivation-for-fraud risk will be greatest when focused on factors for pressure of a 
loss for top managers, rather than on incentives or organizational factors. Table 4, Panel A 
reflects the greatest mean risk assessment (8.7, 95% CI: [8.2, 9.2]) for pressure of loss on top 
managers, which is greater than the mean assessment for incentive for gain to top managers (8.0, 
95% CI: [7.4, 8.5]) or for assessments for organizationally focused factors (7.7, 95% CI: [6.9, 
8.6]). Figure 10 plots these relationships. 
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Figure 10: Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments under Low Compensation Alignment  
 
Although the ANCOVA model in Table 4, Panel B is significant (Global F-statistic = 
6.443, p-value = 0.000), the interaction of fraud motivation type and fraud risk factor focus was 
not significant. Buckless & Ravenscroft (1990) state that ANOVA models (and therefore, 
ANCOVA models) are less powerful as a statistical tool for testing ordinal interactions and that 
contrast coding—a refinement of ANOVA—has increased power for testing ordinal interactions. 
An ordinal interaction is the type predicted in this study, as reflected in Figure 10. Therefore, 
planned contrast test weights of -1, -1, -1, 3 for groups A, B, C and D, respectively are used to 
test whether the mean risk assessment for group D is significantly greater than the mean for A, 
B, and C. The mean for group D is significantly greater (p < .008, one-tailed). Next, planned 
contrast test weights of -1, -1, 2, 0 for groups A, B, C and D, respectively are used to test 
whether the mean risk assessment for group C is greater than those of groups A and B. The mean 
risk assessment for group C is not significantly greater than for groups A or B (p < .253, one-
tailed). Lastly, planned contrast weights of -1, 1, 0, 0 for groups A, B, C and D, respectively are 
used to test whether the mean risk assessment for group B is significantly greater than for group 
A. The mean risk assessment for group B is not significantly greater than for group A (p< .483, 
one tailed). Together, these tests support Hypothesis 1a, which predicts that auditors will assess 
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greater motivation-for-fraud risks for factors framed as a pressure of a loss, rather than incentive 
for a gain, but only when fraud risk factors are focused on individual top managers, rather than 
on the organization.  
Table 4: Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics mean (Standard Deviation) for Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments on a Scale: 1(Low Risk)
to 10 (High Risk)
Incentive Pressure
for a Gain of a Loss Row Mean
FRF focused on the organization, Group A Group B
    (given low compensation alignment between (n = 24) (n = 22) (n = 46)
    payoffs to the organization and to top executives) 7.7 7.7 7.7
(1.5) (1.9) (1.7)
FRF focused on top managers, Group C Group D
    (given low compensation alignment between (n = 22) (n = 21) (n = 43)
    payoffs to the organization and to top executives) 8.0 8.7 8.3
(1.2) (1.1) (1.2)
Column Mean (n = 46) (n = 43) (n = 89)
7.8 8.2 8.0
(1.4) (1.6) (1.5)
Panel B: Results of ANCOVA with the Dependent Variable for Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments
Source of Variation df SS MS F-Statistic p-value
Corrected Model 5 57.100 11.420 6.443 0.000
Focus (Organizational or Individual) (a) 1 15.927 15.927 8.985 0.004
Motivation Frame (Incentive or Pressure) (b) 1 1.370 1.370 .773 0.382
Focus x Motivation Frame 1 2.031 2.031 1.146 0.288
Fraud Opportunity (c) 1 18.847 18.847 10.633 0.002
Fraud Attitude/Rationalization (d) 1 13.538 13.538 7.637 0.007
Error 83 147.125 1.773
Panel C: Planned Contrast on Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments
Value of Standard p-value
Source of Variation Contrast df Error t-statistic (one-tailed)
Contrast Weights are -1, -1, -1, 3 (e) 2.730 85 1.120 2.439 0.009 H1a
Contrast Weights are -1, -1, +2, 0 (e) 0.519 85 0.775 0.670 0.253
Contrast Weights are -1, +1, 0, 0 (e) 0.019 85 0.441 0.043 0.483
(a) Fraud risk factor treatments for organizational focus (Group A and Group B) are coded as 0, and for individual focus (Group C and Group D) are coded as 1.
(b) Fraud risk factor for incentive treatment (Group A and Group C) are coded as 0, and for pressure treatment (Group B and Group D) are coded as 1.
(c) Based on participants' rating of fraud risk reflected on the Opportunities risk work paper, on a scale from 1(low risk) to 10 (high risk).
(d) Based on participants' rating of fraud risks reflected on the Attitude/Rationalization risks work paper, on a scale from 1(low risk) to 10 (high risk).
(e) Contrast weights represent coefficient weights for planned contrasts in the dependent variable between the four treatment groups (A, B, C and D) in
the ANOVA.
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 Hypothesis 2a suggests that a high alignment of top management compensation, linking 
payoffs of top managers with payoffs to the organization, would not be incorporated into auditor 
risk assessments, although compensation should be a consideration in the auditor risk assessment 
process (PCAOB, AS No. 12, 2010; AS No. 14, 2010; AS No. 18, 2014.) H2a predicts that when 
performance payoffs to top managers are highly aligned with financial statement payoffs to the 
Table 5: Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments-High v. Low Compensation Alignment 
  
organization managed, auditors will assess motivation-for-fraud risk as being no different than 
when performance payoffs to top managers are minimally aligned with payoffs to the 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics mean (Standard Deviation) for Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments on a Scale: 1(Low Risk)
to 10 (High Risk) for Low Compensation Alignment versus High Compensation Alignment
Incentive Pressure
for a Gain of a Loss Row Mean
FRF focused on the organization, Group A Group B
    given low compensation alignment between (n = 24) (n = 22) (n = 46)
    payoffs to the organization and to top executives 7.7 7.7 7.7
(1.5) (1.9) (1.7)
FRF focused on the organization, Group E Group F
    given high compensation alignment between (n = 22) (n = 20) (n = 42)
    payoffs to the organization and to top executives 7.5 8.2 7.8
(1.7) (1.2) (1.5)
Column Mean (n = 46) (n = 42) (n = 88)
7.6 7.9 7.8
(1.6) (1.6) (1.6)
Panel B: Descriptive statistics mean (Standard Deviation) for Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments on a Scale: 1(Low Risk)
to 10 (High Risk) for Top Manager Focus versus High Compensation Alignment Treatment
Incentive Pressure
for a Gain of a Loss Row Mean
FRF focused on top managers, Group C Group D
    (given low compensation alignment between (n = 22) (n = 21) (n = 43)
    payoffs to the organization and to top executives) 8.0 8.7 8.3
(1.2) (1.1) (1.2)
FRF focused on the organization, Group E Group F
    given high compensation alignment between (n = 22) (n = 20) (n = 42)
    payoffs to the organization and to top executives 7.5 8.2 7.8
(1.7) (1.2) (1.5)
Column Mean (n = 44) (n = 41) (n = 85)
7.7 8.4 8.1
(1.5) (1.2) (1.4)
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organization. The highly aligned compensation structure in this experiment, if incorporated into 
auditor assessment of organizational risks, ideally, should result in a focus directly on incentive 
for gain or pressure of loss for top executives (equal to the experimental conditions for groups C 
and D). Testing H2a is accomplished by comparing mean motivation-for-fraud risk assessments 
for groups E and F (high compensation alignment) to those of groups A and B (low 
compensation alignment) to support or refute the prediction of no significant difference. The 
relationship between the six group means is illustrated in Figure 11. If the group A, B, C and D 
means are not significantly different, then H2a is supported. However, if the group F mean is 
significantly greater than the group B mean, an interaction relationship is demonstrated such that 
a difference between pressure of loss risk assessments depends on whether there is high or low 
compensation alignment, which would evidence against H2a.    
Since H2a represents a null hypothesis, power analysis was performed before interpreting 
test results. The most powerful test in this experimental setting for determining whether there is 
no significant difference in risk assessments between the minimal or maximal compensation 
alignment conditions is a t-test of whether group F exceeds group B mean risk assessments. A 
power table from Cohen (1988) reflects that the sample sizes of 22 and 20 attained for groups B 
and F, respectively, result in a 46 to 50 percent chance of detecting a medium effect size if it 
exists. This means there is an approximately 50% chance of a Type II error, predicting no 
compensation alignment effect when one actually exists. Based on this power test, an 
insignificant difference between the group F and group B means would be inconclusive. 
However, a significantly greater group F mean relative to the group B mean would constitute 
evidence against H2b. The mean for group F is not significantly different from the mean for 
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group B (t = .837, p = .408, two tailed), but since there is insufficient power to test this null 
hypothesis this is inconclusive evidence. H2a is therefore not supported.                    
Figure 11 reflects the plot of group means from Table 5 for each of the six participant 
groups.  
Figure 11: Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments under All Six Conditions
32
  
 
6.4 Tests of Auditor Decision Hypotheses 
 Table 6 presents eight separate audit decisions made by auditors in this experiment. The 
participants were asked to consider their fraud risk assessments and other facts observed in the 
company case, and to designate the level of these audit planning decisions. Together, these 
decisions represent the nature, timing, and extent of the accounts receivable audit planned by 
participants. Based on the panel of experts consulted by Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009), 
increases in each of these audit steps represent opportunities for the auditor to make audit 
planning decisions that are responsive to the risks presented in this case, which is adapted from 
Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009). In this study, H1b suggests that auditors considering pressure 
                                                          
32
 When participants who failed the manipulation check question for degree of compensation alignment are 
eliminated from the analysis, the mean fraud risk assessments for high compensation alignment are equal (7.8 on a 
ten scale) for both the incentive and pressure conditions. This supports a conclusion that participants who best 
understood the compensation alignment manipulation did not differentiate between the incentive and pressure 
conditions when fraud risk factors were focused on the organization. 
Top Manager Focus (Low Compensation Alignment)
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on top manager risk factors will make greater risk-responsive audit planning decisions than 
auditors considering incentive to top manager risk factors or organizationally focused risk 
factors. The hypothesis development section of this paper suggests that auditors considering risk 
factors focused on the perspective of individual top managers will make greater risk responsive 
audit planning decisions than auditors considering risk factors focused on the perspective of the 
organization. This hypothesis development also suggests that auditors considering risk factors 
framed as pressure of a loss will make greater risk responsive audit planning decisions than 
auditors considering risk factors framed as an incentive for a gain. To the extent that the H1b 
interaction hypothesis is supported for each audit decision, that interaction decision dominates 
and the underlying main effects hypotheses will not be interpreted. However, when the 
interaction hypothesis is not supported for each audit decision, then the main effects will also be 
tested and interpreted.  
 Audit procedures corroborating the existence of accounts receivable can include a variety 
of procedures (AICPA 2002, AU 316.46), and some procedures may be used as alternatives to 
others (AICPA 1991, AU 330.32). The greater the number of audit decision hypotheses 
supported in Table 6, the stronger is the evidence of auditor risk responsive audit decisions. 
However, any evidence of increased auditor response to conditions should be initially evaluated 
as support for H1b, and if not supporting H1b, as support for main effects for fraud risk factor 
motivation type (incentive or pressure) and for main effects for fraud risk factor focus.    
Table 6 reflects that there is evidence of risk-responsive audit decisions made by auditors, 
but the evidence is mixed. Results for one audit decisions is consistent with H1b, two audit 
decisions are consistent with main effects for fraud risk factor motivation type (incentive or 
pressure)  and two audit decisions are consistent with main effects for fraud risk factor focus 
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(company or top manager). Table 6 presents the mean decision measure for the eight different 
audit planning decisions made by participants in each of the initial four treatment groups exposed 
to various motivation-for-fraud risk factors, varied for focus (organization or top manager) and 
motivation type (incentive for a gain or pressure of a loss). Consistent with the analysis of 
auditor risk assessments, contrast coding within an ANOVA model is used to detect ordinal 
interactions between groups for auditor decisions. Also contrast coding is used to test for main 
effects for audit decisions.       
 Because there are multiple dependent variables to be tested, steps should be taken to 
minimize the risk of Type I error that could result from multiple tests. One approach would be to 
conduct a MANCOVA model for all dependent variables, and if the model is significant, conduct 
univariate ANCOVAs for each dependent variable, and then limit post hoc tests to only those 
dependent variables having a significant univariate ANCOVA result. However, the MANCOVA 
reliability is unclear due to inequality of covariance matrices and the mixed results of the 
ANCOVA global F-tests.
33
 The need to run a MANCOVA model is reduced by the fact that 
dependent variables are not highly correlated, with one exception.
34
 Using these same dependent 
variables in a similar test of auditor decisions, Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) elect not to use a 
MANOVA test due to large variances between groups, and instead elect to use contrast coding, 
where t-test p-values can be individually adjusted for equal or unequal variances on a dependent 
variable specific basis. The statistical testing in this paper is conducted in the same manner for 
the H1b and H2b hypotheses. 
                                                          
33
 The Global F-test of significance of the MANCOVA model is as follows: Pillai’s Trace = .100; Wilks’ Lambda = 
.102; Hotelling’s Trace = .105; Roy’s Largest Root = .010. 
34
 The bivariate correlations between all independent variables are low except for the two variables—days 
subsequent receipts examined and days subsequent returns examined, which have a correlation of .854. 
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The case scenario provides participants with seeded risks for accounts receivable and 
revenue recognition fraud, achieved through channel stuffing to distributors. Table 6 reflects that 
auditors who observed fraud risk factors indicating pressure on top managers (group D), send a 
greater mean percentage (52 percent) of accounts receivable confirmations to distributors, a 
proportion greater than those sent by auditors who observed incentives on top managers (group 
C, 46 percent) or who observed organizationally focused risk factors (groups A and B, 46 
percent each) (t = 2.392, p = .019, one tailed). Also, a one-way ANOVA comparison of means 
between groups A, B and C reveals no differences between those three group means (F-statistic 
= .920, p-value = .404). Together, these tests support Hypothesis H1b for the percentage of 
positive confirmations to distributors dependent variable. Group D participants that observed 
pressure on top managers requested the highest percentage of positive confirmations to be sent to 
distributors. Since no other tests of audit decisions for pressure on top managers is significant, 
tests for main effects for fraud risk factor focus and motivation type are next conducted. 
 Main effects for fraud risk factor focus would suggest that auditors considering financial 
statement fraud risks framed from the perspective of individual top managers will make more 
extensive risk-responsive audit planning decisions than when considering those framed from the 
perspective of the organization. Table 6 reflects two audit decisions that are consistent with these 
main effects. The mean number of days past year-end to examine subsequent cash receipts for 
collection of accounts receivable is 59.1 days under fraud risk factors focused on top managers, 
and 52.9 days under fraud risk factors focused on the organization, a significant difference (t = 
2.152, p = .017, one tailed test). The mean number of days past year-end to examine sales returns 
is 58.0 days under FRFs focused on top managers, and 52.2 days under FRFs focused on the 
organization, a significant difference (p = .020, one tailed test). No other test for audit decisions 
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focused on top managers exceeding those focused on the organization in six other audit planning 
questions is significant. 
Main effects for fraud risk factor motivation type (incentive or pressure) predicts that 
auditors considering financial statement fraud risks framed as a pressure of a loss will make 
more extensive risk-responsive audit planning decisions than when considering those framed as 
incentive for a potential gain. Table 6 reflects two audit decisions that are consistent with main 
effects for fraud risk factor motivation type (incentive or pressure). The mean percentage of 
positive accounts receivable confirmations sent to distributors is 50% under FRFs focused on 
pressures of a loss, and 46% under FRFs focused on incentive for a gain, a significant difference 
(t = 2.552, p = .007, one tailed test). Another audit decision, the difference in the percentage of 
subsequent cash receipts examined from accounts receivable from distributors, less that from 
non-distributors in the case is 2.4 percent under pressure of a loss FRFs, and .7 percent under 
incentive for gain fraud risk factors, a significant difference (t = 1.815, p = .038). No other test 
for risk-responsive audit planning decisions for pressure of loss exceeding those under incentive 
for gain in six other audit planning questions is significant. 
Table 6 results follow a pattern. The significant differences in audit decisions observed 
between incentive and pressure factors were associated with audit decisions specific to 
distributors, where the channel stuffing fraud risk was indicated in the case. The significant 
differences in audit decisions observed between company-focused versus top manager-focused 
factors were associated with more general audit procedures for sales returns and subsequent 
collections that did not differentiate between distributors and other customers.  
Taken together, the audit decisions reflected in Table 6 represent the nature, timing and 
extent of testing planned by auditors. Auditing standards require the auditor to perform further  
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Table 6: Mean, (Standard Deviation), and Group Comparison Audit Decisions 
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audit procedures whose nature, timing and extent will be responsive to fraud risks assessed 
(AICPA 2006, AU 318.07). The significantly greater percentage of positive confirmations to 
distributors planned by auditors observing a pressure on top managers represents a risk 
responsive change in the nature of audit procedures. The significantly greater percent of 
subsequent cash receipts observed for distributors versus nondistributors, as planned by auditors 
observing a pressure of a loss, rather than incentive for a gain, also represents a risk responsive 
change in the nature of audit procedures. The significant increase in the number of days to 
observe subsequent receipts and sales returns selected by auditors observing risk factors focused 
on top managers, rather than on the company, represents a risk responsive increase in the         
timing and extent of testing. 
 Since multiple tests of multiple dependent variables have been made, a Type I error risk 
exists that some significant results may be detected only by chance. However, these results are of 
interest because even a single auditor decision leading to the acquisition of additional audit 
evidence improves auditors’ ability to recognize additional risk, which in turn, should lead to the 
acquisition of even more audit evidence. Auditors are permitted to rely on alternative tests to 
achieve the same audit objective for accounts receivable (AICPA 1991, AU 330.32). Accounts 
receivable confirmations, examination of subsequent collections and examination of sales returns 
represent procedures that may be used as alternative or complementary procedures to reach an 
audit objective, depending on the professional judgment of the auditor.     
6.5 Tests of Auditor Decisions under Two Alternate Compensation Schemes 
 The results of tests for H2b are inconclusive overall, so H2b is not supported. Hypothesis 
2b predicts that when performance payoffs to top managers are highly aligned with financial 
statement payoffs to the organization managed, auditors will make audit planning decisions that 
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are no different than when performance payoffs to top managers are minimally aligned with 
payoffs to the organization managed. Results of initial tests tend to support H2b, but are not 
conclusive. Three audit procedures for which significant differences were found in other 
hypotheses
35
 have insignificant differences between the two compensation alignment treatments 
in this hypothesis, which is consistent with H2b. However, two audit planning decisions are 
marginally more extensive when compensation alignment is high. The mean number of days 
selected for examination of sales returns was 58.3 days in the high alignment condition and 52.2 
days in the minimal alignment condition, a difference that is marginally significant using the 
non-directional test of the hypothesis (t-value = 1.854, p-value = .067, two tailed test). The 
difference in the percentage of subsequent cash receipts examined from accounts receivable from 
distributors, less that from non-distributors in the case is 3.6 percent in the high alignment 
condition and 1.0 percent in the minimal alignment condition, a difference that is marginally 
significant using the non-directional test of the hypothesis (t-value = 1.697, p = .094, two tailed 
test).  
While three tests show no significant difference between high and minimal compensation 
alignment, as predicted, the last two tests show that high compensation alignment resulted in 
marginally different and greater risk responsive audit decisions. Also, the results of power 
analysis previously described prevent reliance on interpretation of null hypothesis results. A 
supplemental comparison regarding group F and group D was performed. If group D audit 
dependent variables were significantly greater than those of group F, that fact would provide 
supplemental evidence that fraud risk factors focus on top managers were a greater determinant 
                                                          
35
 Significant differences in decisions were found for the percentage of positive confirmations sent to distributors, 
for the difference in percentage of subsequent cash receipts examined, and for the number of days subsequent 
receipts and returns were examined for accounts receivable.   
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of the extent of audit decisions, while compensation alignment did not matter. Differences 
between group F and group D audit decisions were also not significant. Therefore, the results of 
tests for H2b are inconclusive overall, and H2b is not supported. 
6.6 Practical Significance of Results 
The setting for this experiment is the same for all auditor participants—a setting 
indicative of high risk for financial statement fraud. The only variation between group conditions 
is the form of four risk factors for motivation-for-fraud, and variation between two versions of 
management compensation structure. All participant groups agree, based on group mean risk 
assessments, that the case is a high fraud risk case. The difference in mean risk rating between 
the pressure on top managers condition and other conditions is 1.0 (8.7 versus 7.7) on a 10 scale. 
Table 2, Panel A reflects the greatest mean risk assessment (8.7, 95% CI: [8.2, 9.2]) for pressure 
of loss on top managers, which is greater than the mean assessment for assessments for 
organizationally focused factors (7.7, 95% CI: [6.9, 8.6]). While this risk assessment difference 
of 1.0 (on a 1 to 10 scale)
36
 may seem relatively small to audit practitioners, the associated audit 
decision differences represent actionable differences in the extent of audit testing. See Table 6 
differences between groups for audit decisions made. Auditors in the pressure-on-managers 
condition chose to send six percent more (52 percent versus 46 percent) positive confirmations to 
distributors (where fraud risk was seeded) compared to the incentive-to-managers condition. The 
difference in percentage of subsequent cash receipts examined for accounts receivable from 
distributors, less non-distributors, was greater (2.4 percent versus .7 percent) for auditors in the 
pressure on top managers condition, relative to the incentive on top managers condition. The 
                                                          
36
 In prior literature similar fraud risk assessment differences (on a 1 to 10 scale) have supported significant findings. 
Wilks and Zimbelman support findings base on a decomposed mean risk assessment difference of 2.65 between high 
and low risk conditions, compared to a holistic mean risk assessment difference of 1.27 between high and low risk 
conditions, a difference in differences of 1.38.   
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number of days past year-end to examine subsequent cash receipts was 11% greater (59.1 days 
versus 52.9 days), and the number of days past year-end to examine sales returns was 11 % 
greater (58.0 days versus 52.2 days) when auditors were exposed to risk factors focused on top 
managers, versus on the company.   
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The ultimate objective of this study is not to predict what types of risks are assessed 
relatively greater than others, but rather, to evaluate the potential for increasing auditor 
sensitivity to risks of fraudulent financial reporting. Most fraud risk factor examples for fraud 
motivation presented in auditing standards are organizationally focused risks. The process 
suggested by the results of this study is for auditors to initially recognize whether motivation-for-
fraud risk factors observed are focused on the organization or on top managers, then attempt to 
refocus organizationally focused risk factors into impacts on top managers, and assess whether 
any such impacts represent incentives for personal gains or pressures to avoid personal losses. 
Although organizational risk factors can affect top manager decision making, the incentive or 
pressure effect of such risks are not always obvious until organizational risk factors are 
transformed into risk factors directly impacting top managers. Additional mental processing is 
required for auditors to recognize what direct impacts on top managers can result from 
organizational risk factors. Engaging auditors in this process of transforming risk factors into 
ones closer to pressure on managers will enable them to think more deeply about the true fraud 
motivation impact of initially observed organizational fraud risk factors.  
In this study, most auditor risk assessments (on a scale from one to 10) ranged from six to 
10 for both total fraud risk assessed and for motivation-for-fraud risk assessed. No significant 
differences existed between treatment groups for total fraud risk assessed; yet, this study has 
highlighted a significant difference for motivation-for-fraud risk assessments when auditors are 
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exposed to pressure on top manager risk factors. This result demonstrates that auditors in a 
setting where certain risks are assessed as high risk and others are assessed low risk will be made 
more sensitive to fraudulent financial reporting risk by processing (refocusing and reframing) 
motivation-for-fraud risks as described in the prior paragraph, than they will be by engaging in a 
traditional process of assessing total risk based on risk factors separately assessed under each of 
the three fraud triangle elements.  
7.1 Assessing Fraud Motivation Type 
This study is the first to enhance auditor risk assessment and decision-making through the 
application of prospect theory to audit risk assessment of management motivation to misreport 
earnings. Results support the notion that auditors most often view pressure of a loss as a greater 
motivation-for-fraud risk than incentive for a gain, but only when risk factors are focused on 
individual managers, not on the organization generally. It is also the first study to employ further 
disaggregation
37
 of one of the three elements of the fraud triangle model to further enhance fraud 
risk assessment by differentiating between incentive and pressure for misreporting earnings. 
Implications are that auditing standards setters should encourage auditors to attempt to identify 
whether a fraud risk factor represents an incentive for gain or pressure of loss on top managers 
during the risk assessment process.  
7.2 Assessing Fraud Risk Factor Focus 
This study also proposes a theoretical explanation for why auditors in prior studies 
(Albrecht and Romney 1986; Apostolou 2001; Wilks and Zimbelman 2004) consider certain 
fraud risk factors focused on the organization or industry as relatively lower in relevance, and 
                                                          
37 Disaggregation of the three fraud triangle elements was first explored by Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) and again 
by Favere-Marchesi (2013).  
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factors focused on management as relatively higher in relevance.
38
 The significant result of the 
Focus variable (organizational or individual top manager) for auditor risk assessment in Table 4 
reveals that auditors consider fraud risk factors focused on top managers as greater risks than 
those focused on the organization generally. Results from this study are consistent with 
predictions from application of mental model theory to risk assessment behavior. A mental 
model with more logical steps is required for auditors to assess how organizationally focused risk 
factors can affect top managers making financial reporting decisions. When auditors attempt to 
refocus an organizational level risk factor by considering its impact on top managers, then they 
have the opportunity to think more deeply about the risk factor. This process of refocusing the 
original risk factor identified could have different outcomes depending on the facts involved. If 
an organizational risk factor can be refocused as one impacting top managers, this study finds 
that a relatively greater motivation-for-fraud risk assessment is likely to be made, if there is 
pressure of loss on the manager. Conversely, if this refocusing process results in a conclusion 
that the factor would not have an effect on top managers, then this study indicates that a 
relatively lower motivation-for-fraud risk assessment is likely to result, than if there is pressure 
on the top manager. For example, in one situation, evaluation of an organizational risk could 
reveal a threat to earnings level and stock price impacting CEO and CFO equity incentives, while 
in another situation evaluation of the same organizational risk could reveal no impact on CEO 
and CFO equity incentives (such as when there is low stock ownership or options held are out of 
the money). Therefore, the process of attempting to refocus an organizational risk factor as a risk 
to top managers could result in an upward or downward revision in an initial risk assessment, 
making the auditor more sensitive to the level of risk indicated by the original risk factor. 
                                                          
38 This is not a direct conclusion of these studies, but rather, observations that can be made from the data presented 
in the studies. 
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7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
There are certain limitations to the applicability of this study. These proposed audit risk 
assessment strategies assume that factors motivating individual top managers are always 
identifiable and observable, when in fact, many may not be. When Albrecht (1991, 1982, 2014) 
adds the term ”perceived” to pressure and opportunity in his fraud scale model, he acknowledges 
that motivations for fraud perceived by a manager may not be observable to others. This includes 
auditors. Also, the fraud risk factors in this study relate directly to monetary gains or losses to 
managers, but changes in manager reputation or other non-monetary rewards are also likely to 
motivate top manager behavior. Future research could compare the monetary versus non-
monetary components of fraud motivation. Also, it should be acknowledged that many managers 
will not misreport because they exhibit personal integrity and moral convictions that conflict 
with misreporting behavior. Additional research could further investigate such personal 
characteristics and the circumstances in which they may or may not be influenced by the 
motivation-for-fraud risk factors like those considered in this study.  
The audit decisions made in this study by auditors for the dependent variables involving 
budgeted audit hours varied widely, and results for hypothesized group differences for these 
dependent variables were insignificant. Big 4 firm participants planned a greater mean number of 
hours for audit tests than did non-Big 4 firm auditors. Differences in decisions of Big 4 versus 
non-Big 4 firm audit planning decisions could provide some important insights. More research 
could be performed to better understand auditors’ challenges in estimating time budgets for audit 
procedures, such as the ones considered in this experiment. Additional research could also 
address the time and resources needed by auditors to implement the motivation-for-fraud risk 
assessment process suggested by the results of this study.  
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This study was conducted in a high fraud risk setting for all participant conditions, which 
likely had the effect of restraining the range of auditee risk assessment responses. Future 
research could test auditor response to the fraud risk factor refocusing and reframing strategy in 
both a low fraud risk and high fraud risk setting, in order to evaluate the impact of the strategy on 
auditor efficiency and effectiveness over a range of risk settings.  
In this study, many auditors tended to average their three risk assessments under each of 
the three elements of the fraud triangle categories for organizing fraud risk factors. Research 
could seek to better understand how auditors combine risk assessments, and whether certain 
approaches to combining risk assessments change the sensitivity of risk evaluation.  
The tests of auditor decisions reflected in Table 6 included tests of multiple dependent 
variables. While steps have been taken to limit Type I error risk, it is always possible that some 
auditor decision findings result by chance across these multiple tests. Additional research in 
auditor decision making in response to incentive and pressure risk assessments could further 
clarify the specific findings regarding audit procedure decisions.   
7.4 Conclusion 
Pincus (1989) observed that a red flag checklist used in a fraud case can be more harmful 
than productive, indicating that a checklist of fraud risk factors can limit thinking, rather than 
prompt critical thinking by auditors. Hammersley (2011) finds that the diagnosticity of fraud risk 
factors and the degree to which they support generation of specific testable fraud hypotheses 
affects auditors’ ability to plan effective changes to audit programs. The results of this current 
study support a continued evolution in auditing risk assessment approaches, moving away from 
the checklist mentality observed by Pincus (1989), toward a process of deeper thinking described 
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by Hammersely (2011). Results of this study suggest that auditors can increase their sensitivity 
to fraud risks by engaging in a process of refocusing organizational factors, including executive 
compensation plans, into factors relating to top managers, and assessing whether those risks are 
incentives or pressures on top managers. Sensitivity to fraud risks is important because it should 
lead auditors to assess relatively more evidence when risk is high and relatively less evidence 
when risk is low. This approach balances the desire for effectiveness and efficiency in auditing. 
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Appendix 
Examples of Fraud Risk Factors 
A.1 This appendix contains examples of risk factors discussed in paragraphs 65 through 69 of Auditing 
Standard No. 12, Identifying and Assessing Risks of Material Misstatement. Separately presented are 
examples relating to the two types of fraud relevant to the auditor's consideration—that is, fraudulent financial 
reporting and misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified 
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: (a) 
incentives/pressures, (b) opportunities, and (c) attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a broad 
range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider additional or 
different risk factors. Not all of these examples are relevant in all circumstances, and some may be of greater 
or lesser significance in entities of different size or with different ownership characteristics or circumstances. 
Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not intended to reflect their relative importance or 
frequency of occurrence. 
Risk Factors Relating to Misstatements Arising From Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
A.2 The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial 
reporting. 
Incentives/Pressures 
a. Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating conditions, such as 
(or as indicated by):  
o High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins  
o High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence, or interest 
rates  
o Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the industry or overall 
economy  
o Operating losses making the threat of bankruptcy, foreclosure, or hostile takeover imminent  
o Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate cash flows from operations 
while reporting earnings and earnings growth  
o Rapid growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other companies in the same 
industry  
o New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements  
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b. Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third parties due to 
the following:  
o Profitability or trend level expectations of investment analysts, institutional investors, significant 
creditors, or other external parties (particularly expectations that are unduly aggressive or unrealistic), 
including expectations created by management in, for example, overly optimistic press releases or 
annual report messages  
o Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive—including financing of major 
research and development or capital expenditures  
o Marginal ability to meet exchange listing requirements or debt repayment or other debt covenant 
requirements  
o Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on significant pending transactions, 
such as business combinations or contract awards  
c. Information available indicates that management or the board of directors' personal financial situation is 
threatened by the entity's financial performance arising from the following:  
o Significant financial interests in the entity  
o Significant portions of their compensation (for example, bonuses, stock options, and earn-out 
arrangements) being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for stock price, operating results, 
financial position, or cash flow 
o Personal guarantees of debts of the entity  
d. There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet financial targets set up by the 
board of directors or management, including sales or profitability incentive goals. 
Opportunities 
a. The nature of the industry or the entity's operations provides opportunities to engage in fraudulent financial 
reporting that can arise from the following:  
o Related party transactions that are also significant unusual transactions (e.g., a significant related party 
transaction outside the normal course of business) 
o Significant transactions with related parties whose financial statements are not audited or are audited by 
another firm 
o A strong financial presence or ability to dominate a certain industry sector that allows the entity to dictate 
terms or conditions to suppliers or customers that may result in inappropriate or non-arm's-length 
transactions  
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o Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve subjective 
judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate  
o Significant or highly complex transactions or significant unusual transactions, especially those close to 
period end, that pose difficult "substance-over-form" questions 
o Significant operations located or conducted across international borders in jurisdictions where differing 
business environments and cultures exist  
o Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in tax-haven jurisdictions for which there 
appears to be no clear business justification 
o Contractual arrangements lacking a business purpose  
b. There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:  
o Domination of management by a single person or small group (in a nonowner-managed business) 
without compensating controls  
o Ineffective board of directors or audit committee oversight over the financial reporting process and 
internal control 
o The exertion of dominant influence by or over a related party  
c. There is a complex or unstable organizational structure, as evidenced by the following:  
o Difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling interest in the entity  
o Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial lines of authority  
o High turnover of senior management, counsel, or board members  
d. Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:  
o Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls and controls over interim financial 
reporting (where external reporting is required)  
o High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting, internal audit, or information technology 
staff  
o Ineffective accounting and information systems, including situations involving reportable conditions  
Attitudes/Rationalizations 
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees, that allow 
them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to observation by the 
auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such information should consider it 
in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from fraudulent financial reporting. For example, 
auditors may become aware of the following information that may indicate a risk factor: 
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o Ineffective communication, implementation, support, or enforcement of the entity's values or 
ethical standards by management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical 
standards  
o Nonfinancial management's excessive participation in or preoccupation with the selection of 
accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates  
o Known history of violations of securities laws or other laws and regulations, or claims against 
the entity, its senior management, or board members alleging fraud or violations of laws and 
regulations  
o Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity's stock price or 
earnings trend  
o A practice by management of committing to analysts, creditors, and other third parties to 
achieve aggressive or unrealistic forecasts  
o Management failing to correct known reportable conditions on a timely basis  
o An interest by management in employing inappropriate means to minimize reported earnings 
for tax-motivated reasons 
o Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate accounting on the 
basis of materiality  
o The relationship between management and the current or predecessor auditor is strained, as 
exhibited by the following:  
 Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or 
reporting matters  
 Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as unreasonable time constraints 
regarding the completion of the audit or the issuance of the auditor's report  
 Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappropriately limit access to 
people or information or the ability to communicate effectively with the board of 
directors or audit committee  
 Domineering management behavior in dealing with the auditor, especially involving 
attempts to influence the scope of the auditor's work or the selection or continuance 
of personnel assigned to or consulted on the audit engagement  
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is
k
 f
a
c
to
rs
 w
h
ic
h
 
a
re
 f
o
c
u
se
d
 a
n
d
 f
ra
m
e
d
 d
if
fe
re
n
tl
y
 f
ro
m
 o
n
e
 
a
n
o
th
e
r.
A
p
o
st
o
lo
u
 e
t 
a
l.
 2
0
0
1
B
e
h
a
v
io
ra
l 
R
e
se
a
rc
h
 i
n
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
ti
n
g
T
h
e
 R
e
la
ti
v
e
 I
m
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
 o
f 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
F
ra
u
d
 R
is
k
 F
a
c
to
rs
E
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 4
3
 B
ig
 5
 a
u
d
it
o
rs
, 
5
0
 r
e
g
io
n
a
l/
lo
c
a
l 
fi
rm
 a
u
d
it
o
rs
 a
n
d
 
4
7
 i
n
te
rn
a
l 
a
u
d
it
o
rs
A
u
d
it
o
rs
 r
a
te
 r
e
la
ti
v
e
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
 o
f 
fr
a
u
d
 r
is
k
 f
a
c
to
rs
 
fr
o
m
 S
A
S
 N
o
. 
8
2
. 
T
h
is
 d
e
sc
ri
p
ti
v
e
 e
v
id
e
n
c
e
 i
s 
m
ix
e
d
 
w
it
h
 r
e
sp
e
c
t 
to
 m
o
ti
v
a
ti
o
n
 f
o
r 
fr
a
u
d
 f
a
c
to
rs
 f
o
c
u
se
d
 o
n
 
to
p
 m
a
n
a
g
e
rs
 (
tw
o
 w
it
h
 l
o
w
 r
e
la
ti
v
e
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 o
n
e
 
w
it
h
 h
ig
h
 r
e
la
ti
v
e
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
);
 a
n
d
 i
s 
c
o
n
si
st
e
n
t 
a
b
o
u
t 
fr
a
u
d
 r
is
k
 f
a
c
to
rs
 f
o
c
u
se
d
 o
n
 t
h
e
 o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
in
d
u
st
ry
 (
lo
w
 r
e
la
ti
v
e
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
).
 T
h
is
 s
tu
d
y
 d
o
e
s 
n
o
t 
a
tt
e
m
p
t 
to
 u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
 w
h
y
 a
u
d
it
o
rs
 c
o
n
si
d
e
r 
so
m
e
 f
ra
u
d
 
ri
sk
 f
a
c
to
rs
 m
o
re
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
t 
th
a
n
 o
th
e
rs
.
T
h
e
 c
u
rr
e
n
t 
st
u
d
y
 r
e
lie
s 
o
n
 m
e
n
ta
l 
m
o
d
e
l 
th
e
o
ry
 
to
 m
o
ti
v
a
te
 h
y
p
o
th
e
se
s 
th
a
t 
c
o
m
p
a
re
 t
h
e
 s
im
ila
r 
fr
a
u
d
 r
is
k
s 
w
it
h
 a
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fo
c
u
s 
(t
o
p
 m
a
n
a
g
e
rs
 
o
r 
th
e
 o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
).
 T
h
e
 r
e
su
lt
s 
d
e
m
o
n
st
ra
te
 
th
a
t 
a
u
d
it
o
r 
ri
sk
 a
ss
e
ss
m
e
n
ts
 a
re
 i
n
fl
u
e
n
c
e
d
 b
y
 
w
h
e
th
e
r 
a
 r
is
k
 f
a
c
to
r 
is
 f
o
c
u
se
d
 o
n
 t
h
e
 
o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
 o
r 
o
n
 t
o
p
 m
a
n
a
g
e
rs
.
Jo
h
n
st
o
n
e
 a
n
d
 B
e
d
a
rd
 
2
0
0
1
T
h
e
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 
R
e
v
ie
w
E
n
g
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
P
la
n
n
in
g
, 
B
id
 P
ri
c
in
g
, 
a
n
d
 C
lie
n
t 
R
e
sp
o
n
se
 i
n
 t
h
e
 M
a
rk
e
t 
fo
r 
In
it
ia
l 
A
tt
e
st
a
ti
o
n
 E
n
g
a
g
e
m
e
n
ts
P
ri
m
a
ry
 f
o
c
u
s 
o
f 
st
u
d
y
 w
a
s 
a
u
d
it
 
p
ri
c
in
g
, 
a
s 
in
fl
u
e
n
c
e
d
 b
y
 a
u
d
it
 r
is
k
F
ra
u
d
 r
is
k
 f
a
c
to
rs
 d
id
 n
o
t 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 p
la
n
n
e
d
 a
u
d
it
 
p
e
rs
o
n
n
e
l 
h
o
u
rs
, 
b
u
t 
d
id
 r
e
su
lt
 i
n
 m
o
re
 u
se
 o
f 
sp
e
c
ia
lis
ts
, 
a
n
d
 m
o
re
 t
e
st
in
g
 a
n
d
 r
e
v
ie
w
.
B
e
d
a
rd
 a
n
d
 G
ra
h
a
m
 
2
0
0
2
A
u
d
it
in
g
: 
A
 
Jo
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
P
ra
c
ti
c
e
 &
 
T
h
e
o
ry
T
h
e
 E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
f 
D
e
c
is
io
n
 A
id
 
O
ri
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
n
 R
is
k
 F
a
c
to
r 
Id
e
n
ti
fi
c
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 A
u
d
it
 T
e
st
in
g
 
P
la
n
n
in
g
A
n
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 4
6
 p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
n
g
 
a
u
d
it
o
rs
 f
ro
m
 e
ig
h
t 
o
ff
ic
e
s 
o
f 
tw
o
 
B
ig
 5
 f
ir
m
s.
  
P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
 i
n
c
lu
d
e
d
 
1
9
 s
e
n
io
rs
, 
2
5
 m
a
n
a
g
e
rs
, 
a
n
d
 t
w
o
 
p
a
rt
n
e
rs
.
A
u
d
it
o
rs
 u
si
n
g
 a
 d
e
c
is
io
n
 a
id
 w
it
h
 a
 n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
 o
ri
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
fi
n
d
 m
o
re
 f
ra
u
d
 r
is
k
s 
th
a
n
 t
h
o
se
 u
si
n
g
 a
 d
e
c
is
io
n
 a
id
 
w
it
h
 a
 p
o
si
ti
v
e
 o
ri
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
.
T
h
e
 q
u
e
st
io
n
 a
b
o
u
t 
w
h
e
th
e
r 
m
o
ti
v
a
ti
o
n
 
c
o
m
p
ri
se
d
 o
f 
p
re
ss
u
re
 f
o
r 
fr
a
u
d
 i
s 
e
q
u
iv
a
le
n
t 
to
 
a
 n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
 o
ri
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 w
h
e
th
e
r 
m
o
ti
v
a
ti
o
n
 
c
o
m
p
ri
se
d
 o
f 
in
c
e
n
ti
v
e
 f
o
r 
fr
a
u
d
 i
s 
e
q
u
iv
a
le
n
t 
to
 
p
o
si
ti
v
e
 o
ri
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 r
e
m
a
in
s 
u
n
k
n
o
w
n
, 
a
n
d
 c
o
u
ld
 
b
e
 t
h
e
 s
u
b
je
c
t 
o
f 
fu
tu
re
 r
e
se
a
rc
h
.
A
u
d
it
o
r 
F
ra
u
d
 R
is
k
 A
ss
e
ss
m
e
n
t 
L
it
e
ra
tu
re
 95 
 
 A
u
th
o
r(
s
) 
a
n
d
 Y
e
a
r
J
o
u
rn
a
l
T
it
le
C
o
n
te
x
t
C
o
n
c
lu
s
io
n
s
R
e
la
ti
o
n
s
h
ip
 w
it
h
 t
h
is
 C
u
rr
e
n
t 
P
ro
p
o
s
a
l
G
lo
v
e
r 
e
t 
a
l.
 2
0
0
3
A
u
d
it
in
g
: 
A
 
Jo
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
P
ra
c
ti
c
e
 &
 
T
h
e
o
ry
A
 T
e
st
 o
f 
C
h
a
n
g
e
s 
in
 A
u
d
it
o
rs
' 
F
ra
u
d
-
R
e
la
te
d
 P
la
n
n
in
g
 J
u
d
g
m
e
n
ts
 s
in
c
e
 t
h
e
 
Is
su
a
n
c
e
 o
f 
S
A
S
 N
o
. 
8
2
T
h
is
 s
tu
d
y
 i
s 
a
 p
o
st
-S
A
S
 N
o
. 
8
2
 
re
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
Z
im
b
e
lm
a
n
 (
1
9
9
7
).
  
G
lo
v
e
r 
e
t 
a
l.
 2
0
0
3
 i
s 
a
n
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 9
1
 a
u
d
it
o
rs
 w
it
h
 a
n
 a
v
e
ra
g
e
 o
f 
4
.8
 y
e
a
rs
 o
f 
e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
.
P
o
st
-S
A
S
 N
o
. 
8
2
 p
la
n
n
in
g
 j
u
d
g
m
e
n
ts
 a
re
 m
o
re
 s
e
n
si
ti
v
e
 
to
 f
ra
u
d
 r
is
k
 f
a
c
to
rs
 t
h
a
n
 d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
e
 p
re
-S
A
S
 N
o
.8
2
 
p
e
ri
o
d
. 
 H
o
w
e
v
e
r,
 t
h
e
re
 i
s 
 a
 t
e
n
u
o
u
s 
lin
k
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 r
is
k
 
a
ss
e
ss
m
e
n
ts
 a
n
d
 p
la
n
n
in
g
 d
e
c
is
io
n
s.
  
E
x
te
n
t 
o
f 
te
st
in
g
 i
s 
in
c
re
a
se
d
 f
o
r 
h
ig
h
e
r 
fr
a
u
d
 r
is
k
s,
 b
u
t 
n
o
t 
th
e
 n
a
tu
re
 o
f 
te
st
in
g
.
T
h
e
 H
o
ff
m
a
n
 a
n
d
 Z
im
b
e
lm
a
n
 (
2
0
0
9
) 
te
st
s 
o
f 
a
u
d
it
o
r 
p
la
n
n
in
g
 d
e
c
is
io
n
s 
a
re
 a
d
o
p
te
d
 i
n
 t
h
is
 
c
u
rr
e
n
t 
st
u
d
y
 i
n
 o
rd
e
r 
to
 c
o
n
si
d
e
r 
b
o
th
 t
h
e
 
n
a
tu
re
 a
n
d
 e
x
te
n
t 
o
f 
te
st
s 
p
ro
m
p
te
d
 b
y
 t
h
e
 f
ra
u
d
 
c
a
se
. 
A
sa
re
 a
n
d
 W
ri
g
h
t 
2
0
0
4
C
o
n
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 
R
e
se
a
rc
h
T
h
e
 E
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
n
e
ss
 o
f 
A
lt
e
rn
a
ti
v
e
 R
is
k
 
A
ss
e
ss
m
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 P
ro
g
ra
m
 P
la
n
n
in
g
 
T
o
o
ls
 i
n
 a
 F
ra
u
d
 S
e
tt
in
g
A
n
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 7
4
 p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
 
fr
o
m
 t
h
re
e
 B
ig
 5
 f
ir
m
s.
  
 
P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
 h
a
d
 a
n
 a
v
e
ra
g
e
 o
f 
9
.7
 
y
e
a
rs
 e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
.
F
ra
u
d
 r
is
k
 f
a
c
to
rs
 w
e
re
 i
d
e
n
ti
fi
e
d
, 
b
u
t 
w
e
re
 n
o
t 
a
ss
o
c
ia
te
d
 w
it
h
 m
o
re
 e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
 f
ra
u
d
 p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s 
(o
th
e
r 
th
a
n
 i
n
c
re
a
se
d
 c
o
n
su
lt
a
ti
o
n
 w
it
h
 s
p
e
c
ia
lis
ts
).
W
ilk
e
s 
a
n
d
 Z
im
b
e
lm
a
n
 
2
0
0
4
C
o
n
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 
R
e
se
a
rc
h
D
e
c
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 o
f 
F
ra
u
d
-R
is
k
 
A
ss
e
ss
m
e
n
ts
 a
n
d
 A
u
d
it
o
rs
' 
S
e
n
si
ti
v
it
y
 
to
 F
ra
u
d
 C
u
e
s
A
n
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 9
5
 a
u
d
it
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
rs
 f
ro
m
 t
w
o
 o
f 
th
e
 B
ig
 5
 
fi
rm
s.
A
u
d
it
o
rs
 w
h
o
 d
e
c
o
m
p
o
se
 f
ra
u
d
-r
is
k
 a
ss
e
ss
m
e
n
ts
 i
n
to
 
th
e
 t
h
re
e
 f
ra
u
d
 t
ri
a
n
g
le
 c
a
te
g
o
ri
e
s 
a
re
 m
o
re
 s
e
n
si
ti
v
e
 t
o
 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 a
n
d
 i
n
c
e
n
ti
v
e
/p
re
ss
u
re
 f
ra
u
d
 r
is
k
 f
a
c
to
rs
 
th
a
n
 t
h
o
se
 w
h
o
 d
o
 n
o
t,
 b
u
t 
o
n
ly
 w
h
e
n
 t
h
e
y
 a
re
 i
n
 t
h
e
 l
o
w
 
fr
a
u
d
 r
is
k
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
.
T
h
is
 c
u
rr
e
n
t 
st
u
d
y
 a
ls
o
 p
re
se
n
ts
 f
ra
u
d
 r
is
k
 
fa
c
to
rs
 t
o
 p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
 i
n
 t
h
re
e
 f
ra
u
d
 t
ri
a
n
g
le
 
c
a
te
g
o
ri
e
s.
 H
o
w
e
v
e
r,
 t
h
is
 c
u
rr
e
n
t 
st
u
d
y
 i
s 
e
x
c
lu
si
v
e
ly
 f
o
c
u
se
d
 o
n
 t
h
e
 e
ff
e
c
t 
o
f 
fo
c
u
s 
a
n
d
 
fr
a
m
in
g
 o
f 
m
o
ti
v
a
ti
o
n
-f
o
r-
fr
a
u
d
 r
is
k
s,
 c
a
lle
d
 
in
c
e
n
ti
v
e
/p
re
ss
u
re
 f
ra
u
d
 r
is
k
 f
a
c
to
rs
 i
n
 c
u
rr
e
n
t 
a
u
d
it
in
g
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
s.
M
o
c
k
 a
n
d
 T
u
rn
e
r 
2
0
0
5
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
Jo
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
A
u
d
it
in
g
A
u
d
it
o
r 
Id
e
n
ti
fi
c
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
F
ra
u
d
 R
is
k
 
F
a
c
to
rs
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
ir
 I
m
p
a
c
t 
o
n
 A
u
d
it
 
P
ro
g
ra
m
s
A
 s
u
rv
e
y
 r
e
g
a
rd
in
g
 f
ra
u
d
 r
is
k
 
a
ss
e
ss
m
e
n
t 
w
a
s 
d
e
v
e
lo
p
e
d
 b
a
se
d
 
o
n
 i
n
p
u
t 
o
f 
th
re
e
 i
n
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
C
P
A
 
fi
rm
s 
a
n
d
 w
a
s 
th
e
n
 a
d
m
in
is
te
re
d
 t
o
 
8
0
 p
a
rt
n
e
rs
 i
n
 e
a
c
h
 o
f 
th
e
 t
h
re
e
 
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
n
g
 f
ir
m
s.
T
h
is
 s
tu
d
y
 c
o
n
tr
a
d
ic
ts
 t
h
e
 r
e
su
lt
s 
o
f 
m
o
st
 p
ri
o
r 
re
se
a
rc
h
 
u
p
 t
o
 t
h
is
 p
o
in
t.
 P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
 s
e
lf
-r
e
p
o
rt
e
d
 t
h
a
t 
th
e
 
n
a
tu
re
, 
e
x
te
n
t,
 a
n
d
 s
ta
ff
in
g
 u
se
d
 w
a
s 
re
sp
o
n
si
v
e
 t
o
 t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r 
a
n
d
 t
y
p
e
 o
f 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
te
d
 f
ra
u
d
 r
is
k
s.
H
o
ff
m
a
n
 a
n
d
 
Z
im
b
e
lm
a
n
 2
0
0
9
T
h
e
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 
R
e
v
ie
w
D
o
 S
tr
a
te
g
ic
 R
e
a
so
n
in
g
 a
n
d
 
B
ra
in
st
o
rm
in
g
 H
e
lp
 A
u
d
it
o
rs
 C
h
a
n
g
e
 
T
h
e
ir
 S
ta
n
d
a
rd
 A
u
d
it
 P
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s 
in
 
R
e
sp
o
n
se
 t
o
 F
ra
u
d
 R
is
k
?
A
n
 e
x
p
e
ri
m
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 9
1
 a
u
d
it
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
rs
 f
ro
m
 a
 l
a
rg
e
 i
n
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
a
u
d
it
 f
ir
m
.
B
o
th
, 
st
ra
te
g
ic
 r
e
a
so
n
in
g
 a
n
d
 b
ra
in
st
o
rm
in
g
 l
e
a
d
 t
o
 m
o
re
 
e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
 m
o
d
if
ic
a
ti
o
n
s 
to
 s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 a
u
d
it
 p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s.
 
B
o
th
 s
tr
a
te
g
ic
 r
e
a
so
n
in
g
 a
n
d
 b
ra
in
st
o
rm
in
g
 t
o
g
e
th
e
r 
d
o
 
n
o
t 
le
a
d
 t
o
 a
 g
re
a
te
r 
e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
n
e
ss
 t
h
a
n
 e
it
h
e
r 
o
n
e
 a
lo
n
e
.
T
h
e
 s
a
m
e
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
fo
r 
a
u
d
it
o
r 
p
a
n
n
in
g
 
d
e
c
is
io
n
s 
u
se
d
 b
y
 H
o
ff
m
a
n
 a
n
d
 Z
im
b
e
lm
a
n
 
(2
0
0
9
) 
a
re
 a
ls
o
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
d
 i
n
 t
h
e
 c
u
rr
e
n
t 
st
u
d
y
 t
o
 
m
e
a
su
re
 a
u
d
it
o
r 
d
e
c
is
io
n
-m
a
k
in
g
.
H
a
m
m
e
rs
le
y
 2
0
1
1
A
u
d
it
in
g
: 
A
 
Jo
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
P
ra
c
ti
c
e
 &
 
T
h
e
o
ry
A
 R
e
v
ie
w
 a
n
d
 M
o
d
e
l 
o
f 
A
u
d
it
o
r 
Ju
d
g
m
e
n
ts
 i
n
 F
ra
u
d
-R
e
la
te
d
 P
la
n
n
in
g
 
T
a
sk
s
R
e
v
ie
w
 a
rt
ic
le
A
u
d
it
o
r 
fr
a
u
d
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 w
ill
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
tl
y
 a
ff
e
c
t 
a
u
d
it
o
r 
p
e
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APPENDIX C 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT 
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Welcome!                                       
Thank you for your participation in this study. Your responses will be used for academic 
research purposes. Your reactions to a company case are requested in an effort to gain 
knowledge that could enhance auditing practice. Your responses to this study will be aggregated 
with those of other participants and will not be tracked with your identity or the identity of your 
firm. Only auditing Seniors, Managers, Senior Managers or comparable higher ranking positions 
are qualified to participate in this study. Please respond to questions using an ink pen. Once 
you have committed to an answer, please do not take the time to change it at a later time. 
 
Instructions 
Assume that you are an experienced audit professional on the team auditing the annual financial 
statements of U.S. Instrumentation Corporation (“USI” or “the Company”) for the year ended 
December 31, 2014. As an audit team member newly assigned to lead this engagement, you will 
be reviewing fraud risk factors evaluated by the audit team during initial audit planning, and will 
also be making some audit planning decisions regarding sales and accounts receivable. 
 
General Company Information  
U.S. Instrumentation Corporation is a publicly held manufacturer of analog and digital 
instrumentation gauges used in a wide variety of equipment applications. USI’s stock is traded 
on the NASDAQ. Its product markets are competitive. The product technology demanded by 
end-user customers has been gradually moving away from analog toward digital technology.  
 
   
The company has steadily grown, as shown by its increasing sales from $15.8 million in 1999 to 
nearly $300 million in 2014. 
Sales and Receivables  
Historically, sales have been made through two channels with some accounts handled directly by 
the company and the remaining sales made through licensed distributors. Both the sales handled 
directly by USI and those to licensed distributors are recorded when shipped, which is consistent 
with the Company's policy of shipping FOB shipping point.  Accounts are written off only after 
extensive collection efforts are taken. The allowance for doubtful accounts is based on an 
analysis of accounts outstanding as determined necessary by management. 
Analog 
Digital 
Digital with Analog Appearance 
 98 
 
Specific Audit Information  
PART I 
Risk Assessment Instructions  
Independent of the proceeding General Company Information, your audit team has identified 4 
different opportunity-for-fraud risk factors during earlier interim inquiries of management. 
Because you are a more experienced member of the audit team, you are now rating the level of 
fraud risk posed by each fraud risk factor. 
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Instructions: Opportunity to Commit Fraud Risk Factors 
The following work paper lists fraud risk factors based on opportunity to commit financial 
statement fraud, as could be identified by your audit engagement team. Rate the level of fraud 
risk represented by each factor on a scale from low risk to high risk by darkening the circle 
that represents your best judgment. 
Opportunity for Fraud Risk Assessment Documentation    
Performed by:WCD 
Date:_11/3/14___ 
Fraud Risk Factors Identified By Engagement Team: 
USI has assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve subjective 
judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate. 
 
USI has significant related party transactions not in the ordinary course of business and with related 
entities not audited or audited by another firm. 
 
USI has significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to year-end that pose 
difficult "substance over form" questions.
 
USI has bank accounts and branch warehouse facilities in foreign jurisdictions for which there appears to 
be no clear business justification.
 
 
What is your overall Opportunity fraud risk assessment for financial statement fraud for 
this client on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 10 (high risk)? ____________  
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Instructions: Attitude/Rationalization about Committing Fraud 
Your audit team has also searched for attitude/rationalization-for-fraud risk factors for financial 
statement fraud, but has found none. Over the last 8 years, the management team has been very 
easy to work with and has shown a high level of competence. The company complies with all of 
the corporate governance requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley. Consider this work paper and make a 
fraud risk assessment below on a scale from low risk to high risk, according to your best 
judgment. 
Attitude/Rationalization for Fraud Risk Assessment Documentation 
                       
Performed by:WCD 
Date:_11/3/14___ 
Fraud Risk Factors Identified By Engagement Team: 
Twelve attitude/rationalization fraud risk factor examples from auditing standards were evaluated and 
these risks were determined to not be present at this client. 
Instruction: What is your overall Attitude/Rationalization fraud risk assessment for this 
client on a scale from 1(low) to 10 (high)? ____________ 
 
Management Compensation  
Total top management compensation in this public company is within the range also typically 
paid by its closest peer-group companies. The executive compensation plan at USI is designed to 
retain qualified top executives. Top management compensation is 70% fixed salary, and 30% 
variable bonus, stock grants and options grants. The top management team has total 
ownership in USI stock and options valued at less than one times annual compensation. The 
top five managers combined do not own a controlling interest in the Company. Following is a 
schedule of current year compensation and the ownership in company stock and stock options 
held by the top five executives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value of Stock Total
and Options Annual Value of Equity Owned in Company
Top 5 Execs. Salary Bonus Granted Compensation Stock Options Stock
CEO 1,020,000$    380,000$    190,000$     1,590,000$       910,000$              1,610,000$          
CFO 510,000          139,182      45,600          694,782             198,400                 386,400                
Three VPs 938,400          260,618      32,300          1,231,318          134,700                 273,700                
2,468,400       779,800      267,900        3,516,100$       1,243,100             2,270,100             
70% 100%
Fixed Wage Total Variable wealth as a multiple of
Current Yr Compensation (Based on Unaudited Financials)
30%
Variable Wage
Less than 1 times annual total pay:
total annual compensation
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Instructions: Motivation to Commit Fraud Risk Factors 
As before, read and consider each fraud risk factor that follows for motivation to commit 
financial statement fraud, as identified by your engagement team. Rate the level of fraud risk 
represented by each factor on a scale from low risk to high risk by darkening the circle 
that represents your best judgment. 
 
Motivation for Fraud Risk Assessment Documentation                      Performed by:WCD 
Date:_11/3/14___ 
Fraud Risk Factors Identified By Engagement Team: 
A high degree of competition and market saturation has led to declining margins in the industry, and top management 
believes that its own total compensation will decrease by 15% this year if a new marketing strategy is not successfully 
implemented. 
 
Maintaining an adequate interest coverage ratio (EBITDA/interest expense) has been difficult, and failure to achieve a 
ratio of 1.5 times for 2014 will result in the establishment of a personal loan guarantee by the USI CEO on the debt of 
USI, which guarantee is equal in size to 25% of the total personal net worth of the CEO. 
 
During the first three quarters, USI had a marginal ability to meet financial statement debt covenant requirements, 
which if not met within the 4th quarter will lead it to refinance debt at a higher interest rate. The CFO expects the 
higher interest rate will result in a 12% decrease in annual total compensation of its top five executives. 
 
There are management-favorable 3 year employment contracts in place for the CEO and CFO. These employment 
contracts will be voided and replaced with at-will employment agreements if USI cannot meet a $285 million sales 
target for this year. 
What is your overall Motivation for fraud risk assessment for financial statement fraud for 
this client on a scale from 1 (low risk to 10 (high risk)? ____________ 
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RECAP 
Look back to pages 3, 4, and 5 to review your overall risk rating for opportunity, 
attitude/rationalization, and motivation fraud risk factors. At this time, what is your overall 
financial statement fraud risk assessment for this client on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 10 (high 
risk)? ____________ 
PART II 
New Marketing Plan 
To implement a new marketing plan, distributors were given sales responsibility for all of USI’s 
analog product accounts, which were approximately half of the smaller customers previously 
serviced by USI, while USI continued to service the larger, digital product accounts directly.  
Also, distributors were given significant incentives to buy analog products starting in mid-
November and December.  These incentives included profit sharing opportunities, favorable 
financing terms, and provision of warehousing and storage incentives. 
 
Analytical Procedures 
The table below presents year-end data and analytical procedures performed with year-end and 
11-month unaudited internal financial statements.  The analytical procedures were initially 
performed in early December using unaudited data from the November 30, 2014 and were 
updated in January using unaudited December 31, 2014 balances, as provided by management. 
 
 
See notes (A) and (B), following: 
(A)  Management explained that USI instituted a new marketing strategy in mid-November that led to the increase 
in this ratio.  Responsibility for all sales of analog products was turned over to the distributors, while USI focused 
its marketing efforts on its digital products. 
(B) Management believes the new marketing initiative, described in note (A) above, will be very successful, as 
many distributors placed orders of analog products in the second half of November and December.  Management 
explained that, by year-end, over 90% of the distributors had signed up for the program and placed orders for 
analog products. 
 
11 months 12 months
(Audited) (Audited) (Audited) (Audited) (unaudited) (unaudited)
Key Financial Statement Data: 12/31/2010 12/31/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2013 11/30/2014 12/31/2014
    Net Sales 208,568$   248,972$  275,797$  270,660$   269,497$         293,997$    
    Net Income 2,239          3,361         4,977         5,411          4,084                5,450           
    Accounts Receivable (AR) 27,760        34,493       34,895       38,055        47,057              52,208         
    Allowance for doubtful (DA)
        accounts plus for sales returns 3,028          4,071         3,873         4,684          5,000                5,440           
    Total assets 207,012     231,570     255,614     260,455     265,734           270,896       
Selected Ratios: (annualized)
    Days sales in Accounts Recivable 48.6            50.6            46.2            51.3              (A)  54.4     (B)  64.8
    Allowance for DA as % of AR 10.9% 11.8% 11.1% 12.3% 11.7% 10.4%
    Interest Coverage Ratio 1.5               1.3              1.5              1.4               1.2                     1.5
Annual Amounts and Balances in Thousands (000)
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Audit Plan-Accounts Receivable 
 
 
Instruction: 
Your engagement partner on this client has asked you to challenge the number of confirmations 
sent and other audit decisions made last year, and to independently plan new decisions this year 
base on your risk assessments and other facts you have read in this case. You may use any 
decision you deem necessary, while striving to maintain both effectiveness and efficiency. 
How many of each of the following customer accounts receivable confirmations would you plan 
for this current year audit? 
      Number of  
     Accounts to  
        Confirm 
     12/31/2014 
 
Number of positive confirmations to USI serviced customers: (Last year 35 accounts, with $4,855,000 coverage)    _______ 
Number of positive confirmations to distributors: (Last year 30 accounts, with $995,000 coverage)                 _______ 
Number of negative confirmations to USI serviced customers: (Last year 100 accounts,  
with $3,242,000 coverage)             _______ 
 
Number of negative confirmations to distributors: (Last year 100 accounts, with $3,310,000 coverage)           _______ 
 
 
How many days past year-end would you plan for the following audit decisions for this current 
year audit? 
            Days 
Number of days past year-end to examine subsequent receipts for accounts receivable collections:  
(45 days used last year)           _______ 
 
Number of days past year-end to examine sales returns: (45 days last year)              _______ 
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What percentage coverage would you plan for the following audit decisions for this current year 
audit? 
The % of subsequent cash receipts to examine for collection of USI-serviced accounts receivable for which  
no confirmations were sent: (10% last year)           _______ 
 
The % of subsequent cash receipts to examine for collection of distributor accounts receivable for which  
no confirmations were sent: (10% last year)           _______ 
 
How many hours, if any, would you plan for the following audit decisions for this current year 
audit?  
           Hours 
 
Number of hours of computer assisted audit techniques or computer forensics procedures: (Zero used last year)    _______ 
Number of hours for interviews of client personnel regarding sales and accounts receivable: (Zero used last year)   _______ 
Total hours for all sales and accounts receivable procedures: (96 hours last year)*              _______ 
* Total audit program hours in the line above include all procedures specified above, plus all other sales 
and accounts receivable procedures not specified above, such as: analytical procedures, bad debt and 
receivable aging analysis, cut-off testing, and reconciliation of detail ledgers to summary ledgers.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Final 10 Questions 
Please circle the best answer for each question below.  Do not take the time to look 
backwards into the case to answer any question. 
1. How many total years of experience do you have in public accounting, rounded to the nearest 
year? 
0              1          2           3          4          5             6            7            8           9         10 or more 
 
2. Which of the following best describes your employer? 
a) a Big 4 public accounting firm 
b) a large or medium sized public accounting firm, other than Big 4 
c) a single office or multiple office small public accounting firm 
d) other  
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3. Which of the following best describes your position level in your firm? 
a) Staff  
b) Senior 
c) Manager 
c) Senior Manager 
d) Director 
e) Partner or Principal 
 
4. Which of the following two lists best summarizes top management compensation structure in 
this case? 
 List a)      List b) 
List a: List b: 
30% fixed salary 70% fixed salary 
70% bonus/options/stock grants 30% bonus/options/stock grants 
Executive stock and option ownership value 
exceeding more than 13 times annual 
compensation 
 
Executive stock and option ownership value 
less than annual compensation 
 
 
5. For this question, ignore top management compensation structure, and think only about the 
Motivation-for fraud risk factors you rated in the case. Which one of the following two lists 
best summarizes the potential outcome focus described in the Motivation-for-fraud risk factors 
rated by you in this case? 
a) Outcomes for the Company:        or         b) Outcomes for top executives: 
a) Outcomes for the Company: b) Outcomes for top executives: 
A change in Company earnings A change in top executive compensation 
A change in terms for a Company technology 
license agreement 
A change in terms for the CEO and CFO 
employment agreements 
A change regarding a Company loan guarantee 
on debt of the Company Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan 
A change regarding a CEO personal loan 
guarantee on debt of the Company 
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6. For this question, ignore top management compensation structure, and think only about the 
Motivation-for fraud risk factors you rated in the case. Which one of the following two lists best 
summarizes the potential outcomes described in the Motivation-for-fraud risk factors rated by you in 
this case? 
a) Penalties if targets were not achieved:     or      b) Rewards if targets were achieved: 
a) Penalties if targets were not achieved: b) Rewards if targets were achieved: 
A decline in income An increase in income 
Deterioration in terms for a contract or 
agreement from 3 year terms to monthly or at-
will terms 
Improvement in terms for a contract or 
agreement from monthly or at-will terms to 3 
year terms 
Establishment of a loan guarantee A release from a loan guarantee 
 
 
7. Does your employer conduct audits of public companies? 
a) Yes  b) Unsure c) No 
 
8. How many audit engagements have you worked on within a public company setting during the 
past year?   
0              1          2           3          4          5             6            7            8           9         10 or more 
 
9. In how many professional engagements during your career, if any, would you estimate you 
have you taken steps or caused steps to be taken to evaluate suspected intentional misstatements 
affecting company earnings, which may have been material? ____ 
 
10. If there any final comments you would like to make to the researcher, please write below: 
 
 
 
This concludes the study.  Thank you for your participation. 
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APPENDIX D 
IRB APPROVAL LETTER 
 
 May 1, 2014  
  
Donald  Wengler 
School of Accountancy 
4202 E. Fowler Avenue 
BSN 3305 
Tampa, FL   33620 
 
RE: 
 
Exempt Certification 
IRB#: Pro00017128 
Title: Fraud Risk Assessment Study 
 
Study Approval Period: 5/1/2014 to 5/1/2019 
Dear Mr.  Wengler: 
 
On 5/1/2014, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets USF 
requirements and Federal Exemption criteria as outlined in the federal regulations at 
45CFR46.101(b): 
 
 
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), 
survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: 
(i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, 
directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human 
subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or 
civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation. 
 
Approved Documents: 
IRB Protocol 041014.docx 
CPA Informed Consent 043014.docx 
Student Informed Consent 043014.docx  
 
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is 
conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in 
the Belmont Report and with USF IRB policies and procedures. Please note that changes to this 
protocol may disqualify it from exempt status.  Please note that you are responsible for notifying 
the IRB prior to implementing any changes to the currently approved protocol.   
 
The Institutional Review Board will maintain your exemption application for a period of five 
years from the date of this letter or for three years after a Final Progress Report is received, 
whichever is longer.  If you wish to continue this protocol beyond five years, you will need to 
submit a new application at least 60 days prior to the end of your exemption approval period.  
Should you complete this study prior to the end of the five-year period, you must submit a 
request to close the study. 
 
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University 
of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections.  If you have 
any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638. 
 
Sincerely,  
   
Kristen  Salomon, Ph.D., Vice Chairperson 
USF Institutional Review Board 
